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Software vulnerabilities can be defined as software faults, which can be exploited as 
results of security attacks. Security researchers have used data from vulnerability 
databases to study trends of discovery of new vulnerabilities or propose models for 
fitting the discovery times and for predicting when new vulnerabilities may be 
discovered. Estimating the discovery times for new vulnerabilities is useful both for 
vendors as well as the end-users as it can help with resource allocation strategies over 
time.  
Among the research conducted on vulnerability modeling, only a few studies 
have tried to provide a guideline about which model should be used in a given situation. 
In other words, assuming the vulnerability data for a software is given, the research 
questions are the following: Is there any feature in the vulnerability data that could be 
used for identifying the most appropriate models for that dataset? What models are 
more accurate for vulnerability discovery process modeling? Can the total number of 
publicly-known exploited vulnerabilities be predicted using all vulnerabilities reported 
for a given software? 
To answer these questions, we propose to characterize the vulnerability 
discovery process using several common software reliability/vulnerability discovery 
models, also known as Software Reliability Models (SRMs)/Vulnerability Discovery 
Models (VDMs). We plan to consider different aspects of vulnerability modeling 
including curve fitting and prediction. 
Some existing SRMs/VDMs lack accuracy in the prediction phase. To remedy 
the situation, three strategies are considered: (1) Finding a new approach for analyzing 
vulnerability data using common models. In other words, we examine the effect of data 
manipulation techniques (i.e. clustering, grouping) on vulnerability data, and 
investigate whether it leads to more accurate predictions. (2) Developing a new model 
that has better curve filling and prediction capabilities than current models. (3) 
Developing a new method to predict the total number of publicly-known exploited 
vulnerabilities using all vulnerabilities reported for a given software. 
The dissertation is intended to contribute to the science of software reliability 
analysis and presents some guidelines for vulnerability risk assessment that could be 
integrated as part of security tools, such as Security Information and Event 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Vulnerabilities are software faults, that have the potential to be exploited as 
results of security attacks [1]. The process of vulnerability risk assessment can be 
investigated from two different perspectives: (1) based upon the influence 
vulnerabilities have on software, or (2) based upon the risk which is associated with a 
single vulnerability [2]. 
At the software level, the risk of detecting new vulnerabilities can be assessed 
through determining the number of vulnerabilities that are going to be detected over 
time. Even though public vulnerability resources such as the common vulnerability 
exposures (CVE), national vulnerability database (NVD), and open source 
vulnerability database (OSVDB) exist, estimating the total number of vulnerabilities 
associated with a software is still difficult.  
Software reliability models (SRMs) are well known and have been studied for 
over 40 years [3]. These models have been widely used for assessing the risk associated 
with vulnerabilities because vulnerabilities are software faults that can be exploited as 
the result of security attacks. Research has been conducted to create a link between the 
fault discovery process and the vulnerability discovery process for modeling purposes 
[4]. Thus, vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) and Software Reliability Models 
(SRMs) can be considered similar based on the fault detection processes [1]. 
Researchers have used data from various vulnerability databases to study trends 
of discovery of new vulnerabilities and used various models for predicting when new 
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vulnerabilities may be discovered [1], [3], [5]–[8]. Several studies have proposed new 
SRMs/VDMs or applied existing models to estimate security indicators such as total 
number of residual vulnerabilities in the system, time to next vulnerability (TTNV), 
vulnerability detection rate, etc. [1], [3]–[12].  
Another approach for analyzing vulnerabilities is to find the risk associated with 
each vulnerability to help companies in making decisions with respect to the severity 
level of vulnerabilities and determining priorities for patching vulnerabilities. It is 
critical to rank the severity and exploitability of vulnerabilities since companies use 
such information to allocate their resources. 
Overall, estimating the discovery times for new vulnerabilities is useful both 
for vendors and for the end-users as it can help with their resource allocation strategies 
over time.  
1.2 Research Questions and Approaches 
RQ1: Are there any features in the vulnerability data that could be used for 
identifying the most appropriate models for that dataset? There are few studies that 
have tried to provide guidance about which model should be used in a given situation. 
We address this problem by applying common VDMs on the vulnerabilities associated 
with eight software and compared their prediction accuracy.  
RQ2: What models are more accurate for vulnerability discovery process 
modeling? The lack of prediction accuracy is another issue regarding reliable 
vulnerability risk assessment. Two strategies can be considered: (1) Finding a new 
approach for analyzing vulnerability data still using common VDMs (2) Introducing a 
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new approach with better prediction capabilities. In this research, we examine both 
strategies: 
- We examine the effect of a data manipulation techniques (i.e. clustering, 
grouping) on vulnerability data, and investigate whether this approach leads 
to more accurate predictions compared to those without using clustering. 
- We introduce a new approach using a neural network model with more 
accurate predictions than those from common VDMs.  
RQ3: Can the total number of publicly-known exploited vulnerabilities be 
predicted using all vulnerabilities reported for a given software? Exploited 
vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities, which were exploited as the result of a security 
attack. They typically form a small portion of all the vulnerabilities reported for a given 
software (generally from 2-7% per software version). A huge proportion of the 
vulnerabilities may never exploited over the lifetime of a software. With such a small 
number of known exploited vulnerabilities compared to the total number of 
vulnerabilities, it is difficult to mathematically model and predict when a vulnerability 
with a known exploit will be reported. We study this issue by introducing an approach 
for predicting the total number of publicly-known exploited vulnerabilities using all 
publicly-known vulnerabilities reported for a given software.  
1.3 Contributions 
In this thesis, we present some guidelines to model the vulnerability discovery 
process of a given vulnerability dataset. We compare the model fitting and prediction 
capabilities of eight models: one right-skewed distribution model, one flexible-skewed 
distribution model, three symmetric distribution models, one Power-law model, one 
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exponential model, and one quadratic model. We use two different data processing 
approaches. In the first approach, all the vulnerabilities are considered together, while 
in the second approach they are initially clustered and then modeled. We calculate the 
accuracy for each model’s fitting and prediction capabilities and analyze the average 
bias of the models (i.e., whether the models were overestimating or underestimating 
the number of vulnerabilities).  
 We then use the eight VDMs to compare their prediction capabilities with the 
ones of a neural network model.  
We also study the link between publicly-known disclosure times of exploited 
vulnerabilities and all publicly-known vulnerabilities reported. Using this link, we 
mathematically model and predict when a vulnerability with a known exploit will be 
reported.  
We apply the models on eight datasets: four datasets of well-known operating 
systems (i.e., Windows, Mac, IOS and Linux) and four datasets of well-known web 
browsers (i.e., Internet Explorer, Safari, Firefox and Chrome).   
Our results showed that, given all the uncertainties associated with our datasets:  
 Considering only VDMs, in terms of prediction accuracy, our proposed 
clustering approach led to more accurate results in 58% of the cases, 
while the commonly used approach (without clustering) resulted in 
more accurate results in 42% cases. 
 Our presented a new modeling approach using neural networks 
provides higher curve fitting and prediction capabilities than current 
VDMs.   
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 Our proposed approach, which predicts the total number of publicly-
known exploited vulnerabilities using all publicly-known 
vulnerabilities reported for a given software has higher prediction 
capabilities than current VDMs. 
1.4 Dissertation Outline  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the 
related work. Chapter 3 describes the datasets and models that we used in our research. 
Chapter 4 applies the models without using clustering and compares them in terms of 
curve-fitting and prediction capabilities. Chapter 5 describes the clustering technique 
and a descriptive analysis of the vulnerability datasets after being clustered. It also 
presents the results of using the clustered datasets with the models for fitting and 
prediction respectively and provides a comparison between the capabilities with 
clustered and non-clustered data. Chapter 6 discusses the effect of another data 
manipulation technique (vulnerability grouping) on prediction capabilities of the 
VDMs. Chapter 7 presents a new modeling approach using neural networks and 
evaluates its prediction capability versus VDMs. Chapter 8 presents a new approach 
for modeling and predicting the total number of publicly-known exploited 
vulnerabilities using all publicly-known vulnerabilities reported. Chapter 9 discusses 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Vulnerability Databases 
Several publicly available vulnerability databases and security advisories exist 
such as the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD), Common Vulnerabilities, 
Exposures (CVE), etc. They provide vulnerability features including Common 
Vulnerabilities and Enumeration (CVE) identifiers, severity, Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) scores, published date, patch date, discovery date, and 
vulnerability type. However, there is no ideal source for vulnerabilities since they 
usually overlap and complement each other. Then, as a solution, it is better to use a 
combination of datasets [5].  
2.1.1 NVD database 
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is a public database and is 
commonly used for research on vulnerability discovery modeling. The NVD, by 
providing official information about all pre-detected computer vulnerabilities, helps to 
successfully inform and warn the public about existing vulnerabilities. Since its 
introduction in 1997, information associated with more than 43,000 software 
vulnerabilities affecting more than 17,000 software applications has been published by 
NVD. This valuable information is a great help in understanding trends and detecting 
patterns in software vulnerabilities, so that security decision makers could better 
monitor the security of computer systems that are pestered by the ubiquitous software 
security flaws [13].  
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 However, the NVD comes with some shortcomings such as chronological 
inconsistency (there is not a unique published date for a given vulnerability among the 
public repositories), incomplete inclusion (it does not include every detected 
vulnerability), lack of documentation and repetitive records of a single discovery event. 
These issues may have been derived from the fact that the NVD was not configured 
with vulnerability modeling needs in mind [5]. Each vulnerability entry in NVD 
consists of some fields associated with that vulnerability including Common 
Platform Enumeration (CPE), and Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). 
Based on [13], CPE is defined as “an open framework for communicating the 
characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities, which provides us with information 
on a piece of software, including version, edition, language”. 
CVSS is a scoring system designed to provide a standardized mechanism for 
evaluating the risk associated with vulnerabilities. Communicating the base, temporal 
and environmental properties of a vulnerability helps organizations rate the risk 
associated with that vulnerability. Some components of the CVSS vector are as follows 
[13]: 
- Access Complexity: the difficulty level of the attack required to exploit the 
vulnerability   
- Authentication: indicates whether authenticate is required in order to exploit 
a vulnerability  
- Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability: These features are three loss types 
of attacks. Confidentiality loss indicates the condition when information is leaked to 
people who are not supposed to know it. Integrity loss indicates the condition when 
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illegal modification of data is permitted. Availability loss refers to the situation when 
the compromised system is not capable of performing its predefined task or is crashed.  
The final CVSS Score is calculated based upon the mentioned features, with the 
goal of indicating the severity associated with a vulnerability. 
2.1.2 CVE database 
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is another free to use source 
of vulnerabilities hosted by MITRE1. CVE is designed to allow vulnerability databases 
to be linked together, and to make the comparison of security tools and services more 
straightforward for users. The creation of this list dates to September 1999 [5]. 
According to the CVE's FAQ2, “CVE is a dictionary that provides definitions for 
publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exposures. The goal of CVE is to 
make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, databases, 
and services) with these definitions”. In this list, every vulnerability is assigned an 
identification code known as Common Vulnerabilities and Enumeration Identifier 
(CVE ID). Thanks to these identifiers, the process of sharing data among network 
security databases and tools has become straightforward since they provide a baseline 
for evaluation of the security tools’ coverage [14]. This source of data includes many 
features about vulnerabilities that can be leveraged in our analysis. These features are 
usually derived from CVE entries. Each CVE entry in this database includes3: a CVE 
ID (i.e., "CVE-1999-0067", "CVE-2014-10001"), a brief description of the security 
vulnerability and at least one pertinent reference (i.e., vulnerability reports and 






advisories). All these information are assigned to a vulnerability by a CVE Numbering 
Authority (CNA). CNAs consist of authorized organizations from around the world 
eligible to assign CVE IDs to vulnerabilities affecting products within their disclosure, 
for inclusion in first-time public announcements of new vulnerabilities.  
2.1.3 SecurityFocus 
SecurityFocus as a computer security portal is a home to the well-known 
Bugtraq mailing list. Based on SecurityFocus’s FAQ4, “BugTraq is a full disclosure 
moderated mailing list for the detailed discussion and announcement of computer 
security vulnerabilities: what they are, how to exploit them, and how to fix them”. Each 
vulnerability entry in this database includes: a Bugtraq ID, a CVE ID, a published date, 
a brief description of the security vulnerability, and at least one public reference. 
2.1.4 CXSecurity/WLB2 
World Laboratory of Bugtraq is another collection of information on data 
communications safety. Based on CXSecurity’s FAQ5, every single user can interact 
with the database and report a vulnerability. However, each safety note in verified by 
CXSecurity. Each vulnerability entry in this database includes: a Bugtraq ID, a CVE 
ID, a published date, a brief description of the security vulnerability, and at least one 
public reference. Each entry in this database includes: a Bugtraq ID, a CVE ID, a 
published date, a brief description of the security vulnerability, and at least one public 
reference. 
                                                 
4 https://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/description 
5 https:// https://cxsecurity.com/wlb/about/ 
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2.1.3 Exploit database (EDB) 
EDB records exploits and vulnerable software [15]. According to the 
explanations provided in EDB's official website6, “The Exploit Database is a CVE 
compliant archive of public exploits and corresponding vulnerable software, developed 
for use by penetration testers and vulnerability researchers.” It reports vulnerabilities 
for which there is at least a proof-of-concept exploit. The process of collecting proof-
of-concept exploit data is more convenient than collecting data on actual attacks. 
Based on [16], “a proof-of-concept exploit is merely a byproduct of the so-called 
‘responsible vulnerability disclosure’ process, whereby a security researcher that 
finds a vulnerability discloses it to the vendor alongside a proof-of-concept 
exploitation code that proves the existence of the vulnerability itself”. Most of 
EDB’s data are derived from Metasploit, a tool for creating and executing exploit code 
against a target machine. It provides a search utility that uses a CVE number to find 
vulnerabilities that have an exploit. In this repository, every vulnerability is assigned 
an identification code known as EDB Identifier (EDB ID), a CVE ID, an exploit date, 
and a description.  
2.2 Vulnerability Risk Assessment and Modeling: Software Level 
Even though vulnerability resources such as the common vulnerability 
exposures (CVE), national vulnerability database (NVD), and open source 
vulnerability database (OSVDB) are available, estimating the total number of 
vulnerabilities in a software is still difficult. Software reliability models (SRMs) are 




well known and has been studied for over 40 years [3]. Several studies have applied 
SRMs to estimate software security indicators like the total number of residual 
vulnerabilities, time to next vulnerability (TTNV), and vulnerability density [3], [6]–
[8], [17], [18]. 
The earliest effort at modeling software reliability was a Markov birth-death 
model introduced by Hudson in 1967 [19]. A good overview of several SRMs that 
characterize the process of software defect-finding is provided in [3]. Recently, a few 
vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) have been proposed to estimate the number of 
total vulnerabilities in a given software/system. Since vulnerabilities are software faults 
which are exploited as a result of security attacks [1], VDMs and SRMs can be 
considered to be similar based on the fault detection processes [1]. Research has been 
conducted to create a link between the fault discovery process and the vulnerability 
discovery process for modeling purposes [4]. 
The earliest study on modeling the vulnerability discovery process was 
conducted in 2002, when Anderson [20] proposed the first VDM termed the Anderson 
Thermodynamic (AT) model. Since 2002, a few other VDMs have been proposed. 
Rescorla [6], [7] proposed a VDM to estimate the number of undiscovered 
vulnerabilities. In 2005, Alhazmi et al. [21] proposed the application of SRMs to 
vulnerability discover modeling. The same year, they also introduced a logistic VDM 
known as Alhazmi–Malaiya Logistic (AML) model, which assumes a symmetrical 
shape around the peak discovery rate value [8].  
In another study [21], Alhazmi and Malaiya found that the AML model 
provides better goodness-of-fit results compared to Rescorla and Anderson models. 
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Moreover, an effort-based model was also introduced that uses system installations 
instead of calendar time as the independent factor. In other words, the authors argued 
that discovering a vulnerability associated with a software installed on a larger group 
of computers is more rewarding. However, the effort-based model requires knowing 
the number of users for a target product in market share, which is not always easy to 
obtain. 
A Weibull distribution-based VDM was proposed by Kim in 2007 [22]. The 
author argued that the assumption made by the AML model that the vulnerability 
discovery rate is symmetric around the peak is not always consistent. He leveraged a 
Weibull distribution to model the asymmetric trend of the discovery rate as an 
alternative to the AML model. However, the Weibull model did not always provide a 
good fit. Li et al. [23] empirically showed that, in comparison to other reliability 
models, a Weibull model is better for estimating defect occurrence across a wide range 
of software systems. 
Several studies applied existing models to different types of software packages, 
such as operating systems and web servers, to simulate the vulnerability discovery rate 
and predict the number of vulnerabilities that may potentially be present but not yet 
found [17], [18], [24]. Other studies tried to increase the accuracy of the vulnerability 
discovery modeling by examining the skewness of the vulnerability data [25].  
Research on reliability and risk assessment with a continual vulnerability 
discovery process has recently started. Studies provided by Anderson [20], Rescorla 
[6], [7], Alhazmi and Malaiya [8], [18], [21], Kim [26], Ozment and Schechter [27], 
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Ozment [5], Chan et al. [28], Joh and Malaiya [25] proposed a number of VDMs 
capable of making different projections on vulnerabilities’ disclosure trends. 
2.3 Vulnerability Risk Assessment and Modeling: Vulnerability Level 
Another approach for analyzing vulnerabilities is to find the risk associated with 
each vulnerability. Such an approach helps companies to make decisions with respect 
to the severity level of vulnerabilities. Ranking vulnerabilities is a hard task since it is 
often difficult to predict how attackers could exploit a vulnerability and use the exploit. 
Therefore, the risk that different vulnerabilities face is often unknown until they are 
exploited. In addition, comparing the severity of vulnerabilities is difficult when 
leveraging their descriptions. It is possible that a simple programing bug can lead to 
more harm than a major system flaw. Several studies analyze and model vulnerabilities 
based on their technical features such as exploitability and come up with better 
estimations. We can divide them into studies that focused on examining sources code 
of software, vulnerability life-cycle, CVSS metrics, and system calls. 
2.3.1 Based on source code 
In addition to vulnerabilities’ publication dates, some studies used software 
source code for vulnerability assessment in the context of VDMs. Kim et al. [22] 
proposed a VDM based on shared source code measurements among multi-version 
software systems using the source code and vulnerability data of two major versions of 
Apache HTTP Web server and two major versions of Mysql DBMS. In 2006, Ozment 
and Schechter applied a reliability growth model to evaluate the security of the 
OpenBSD OS by examining its source code and the rate at which new code has been 
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introduced [27]. However, it has been shown that source code cannot be an adequately 
efficient measure in terms of prediction [5].  
Younis [2] assessed vulnerability exploitability for individual vulnerabilities 
based on source code properties regardless of the availability or unavailability of a 
patch. In addition to the vulnerabilities publication dates, he took advantage of software 
source code for vulnerability analysis in the context of VDMs. 
Nagappan and Ball [15] performed a pre-release defect prediction using relative 
code churn metrics on Windows Server 2003. Their multiple linear regression model 
using principal components analysis provided a high correlation between the estimated 
failures and the actual failures in software modules (r=0.889 for the Pearson correlation 
and r=0.929 for the Spearman rank correlation). The relationships between code 
complexity and vulnerabilities of the Mozilla JavaScript engine at the function level 
was studied by Shin and Williams [29]. The correlations between code complexity and 
vulnerabilities were weak (Spearman r=0.3 at best) but statistically significant [29]. 
Shin et al. [30] through an empirical study showed that by using complexity and code 
churn metrics, VDMs are capable of predicting vulnerable code locations with high 
number of calls during a security breach. However, it may generate many false 
positives. In 2013, Shin [31] showed that the performance of fault and vulnerability 
prediction is largely affected by the number of the reported faults and vulnerabilities in 
previous releases. 
Recently, Nguyen et al. proposed an automated method that determines the code 
evidence for the presence of vulnerabilities in previous software versions to evaluate 
whether the target version is vulnerable or not [32]. 
15 
 
2.3.2 Based on vulnerability lifecycle 
Disclosure time, exploitation time, and patching time create the lifecycle of a 
vulnerability. In 2006, a vulnerability lifecycle model was presented by Arbaugh et al. 
[10] to measure the number of intrusions during the vulnerability lifecycle. Frei et al. 
[11], [12], linked the patching process to the lifecycle of a vulnerability. They extended 
Arbaugh et al.’s model using more than 80,000 vulnerabilities; they identified and 
measured three types of risk exposures as black, gray, and white.  They also showed 
that exploits are often faster to occur than patches. This work has been extended by 
Shahzad et al. [33], who conducted a descriptive statistical analysis of a large software 
vulnerability dataset employing clustering on NVD and OSVDB datasets that included 
vendors and software. 
A risk measure was defined by Joh and Malaiya [34] as a probability of adverse 
events and their impacts. Using Markovian stochastic models, they utilized the 
vulnerability lifecycle to measure the likelihood of vulnerability exploitability for an 
individual vulnerability and for the whole system. However, the transition rate between 
vulnerability lifecycle events has not been determined and the probability distribution 
of lifecycle events remains to be studied. 
Zero-Day vulnerability and its lifespan have been defined by McQueen et al. 
[35]. Based upon their definition, the zero-day lifespan refers to the time between the 
vulnerability discovery date and the public disclosure date. They were able to identify 
the actual vulnerability discovery dates for 15 vulnerabilities. They also compared the 
CVSS base score to mean lifespan. Younis [2] considered time to vulnerability 
disclosure (TTVD) or lifespan starting from the vulnerability birth date and correlated 
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the TTVD with the CVSS base score. Bozorgi et al. [36] refused to do prediction of 
zero-day vulnerabilities since he believed that their reports occur with the vulnerability 
already exploited. 
2.3.3. Based on CVSS metrics 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) metrics are used to measure 
the severity of vulnerabilities [2]. Exploitability (the ease of exploiting a vulnerability) 
and impact (the effect of the exploitation) are indicators of the severity. Joh and 
Malaiya in [34] leveraged the impact related metrics from CVSS to determine the 
exploitability impact. They applied their metric to assess the risk of two systems that 
had known unpatched vulnerabilities using actual data. 
Descriptive approaches and trends in scheduling of vulnerability patching and 
exploitation exist. However, most of them use exploit data from OSVDB that does not 
provide sufficient information about the actual exploitation of a vulnerability and 
usually the dates reported for exploits by this source are not accurate enough [37]. NVD 
timing data has also been reported to generate an unforeseeable amount of noise 
because of how the vulnerability disclosure process works [16], [37].   
2.3.4. Based on system calls 
System calls are entry points to privileged kernel operations [2]. A system call 
from a user function can violate the least privilege principle. The principle of least 
privilege indicates a security protocol, where each part of a system has only the 
privileges that are needed for its function. In this condition, even if attackers gain access 
to one part, they would have only limited access to the whole system [38]. An analysis 
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of UNIX system calls was presented by Bernaschi et al. [39]. They classified system 
calls according to their level of threat with respect to system penetration. To control 
system calls, they proposed the Reference Monitor for UNIX System (REMUS), a 
mechanism to detect an intrusion that may use these system calls. Younis [2] applied 
their idea utilizing system related attributes such as attack surface entry points, call 
function analysis, and the existence of dangerous system calls to measure the 
exploitability of a known vulnerability. 
2.4 Methods of Analysis & Risk Assessment Strategies 
Several other strategies exist to provide a better understanding of software risk. 
One is splitting vulnerabilities based on their specifications and studying their behavior 
in specific subsets like zero-day vulnerabilities. In addition, some studies focused on 
finding an optimized plan for patch releases with respect to the vulnerability discovery 
process to diminish the side effects of malicious attacks. 
2.4.1 Cluster-based analysis 
Clustering is a form of classification method that is very useful in understanding 
the complex nature of multivariable relationships. In others words, clustering is a 
method of searching data to detect similarities and dissimilarities in order to find a 
structure of natural groupings [40]. 
Clustering can be done for different purposes including splitting real-world 
exploited vulnerabilities from those which were exploited during software testing [41], 
and detecting exploited vulnerabilities versus non-exploited ones when there is not 
enough information about some vulnerabilities [42]. While clustering is categorized as 
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an explanatory method to simplify the interpretation of data, in most practical 
applications, to distinguish “good” groupings from “bad” groupings, the researcher 
should know enough about the context. 
Generally, clustering algorithms are divided into hierarchical methods 
(connectivity-based clustering, used when the number of items is less than 100), non-
hierarchical methods (centroid-based clustering, used for more the 100 items), 
distribution-based clustering (used when Clusters can be defined as items belonging 
most likely to the same distribution), and density-based clustering (used when clusters 
are defined as areas of higher density than the remainder of the data set) [40]. 
Most efforts require a measure of “closeness”, or “similarity” to provide a group 
structure from a complex data set. When data are clustered, the similarity should be 
indicated by a measure of distance. The most common distance measures are the 
Euclidian distance, the geometric distance in multidimensional space, and the 
Mahalanobis distance which is based on the covariance matrix of the variables [40]. 
Lee et al [43] investigated a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack 
detection method using cluster analysis. Looking into the steps needed to develop a 
DDoS attack and extracting several traffic variables which best illustrate each phase of 
the DDoS attack, the authors performed cluster analysis to find precursors for proactive 
detection of the attack. Shahzad et al [33] conducted a descriptive statistical analysis of 
a large software vulnerability dataset employing clustering on type-based vulnerability 
data. Huang et al [44] classified NVD vulnerabilities employing several clustering 




2.4.2. Machine learning  
Machine learning focuses on automatic recognition of complex patterns and 
making intelligent predictions or decisions based on data. The technique for learning a 
classifier (or a function) from training examples when each example is associated with 
a true label is called the supervised learning method, and it is composed of two main 
phases [45]. The first phase is the learning or training phase. In this phase, a machine 
learning algorithm is run on a fraction of training data that consists of pairs of input 
data (a vector of integers) and their associated output to learn a classifier. Testing is the 
second step where the pre-learned classifier is tested on the rest of the data to estimate 
the testing precision of the classifier.  
Bozorgi et al. [36] measured vulnerability severity based on analyzing 
vulnerability exploitability. They discussed the weakness of exploitability measures 
like CVSS base score metric in providing sufficient information about the vulnerability 
severity. CVSS metrics are the de facto standard that is used to measure the severity of 
vulnerabilities [46]. However, CVSS exploitability measures have come under some 
criticism. They [36] believed that CVSS metrics are only built upon expert knowledge 
and static formula. 
To remedy the situation, the authors proposed a machine learning model using 
supporting vector machines (SVMs) and a data mining technique that can predict the 
possibility of a vulnerability getting exploited. In their study, using the CVSS 
exploitability metric identified many vulnerabilities with a high severity score even 
though there were no known exploits for those vulnerabilities. This indicates that the 
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CVSS score does not differentiate between exploited and non-exploited vulnerabilities. 
This result was also confirmed by [16], [47]. 
Younis et al. [42] leveraged software properties such as the attack surface entry 
points, the source code structure, and the vulnerabilities location to determine the 
vulnerabilities’ exploitability. Younis’s approach is particularly important for newly 
released applications that do not have a large amount of historical vulnerabilities. 
Logistic Regression (LR), Naive Bayes (NB), Random Forests (RF), and Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) are the machine learning techniques employed in the study. 
The SVM, when the principal component analysis (PCA) was used, has performed best 
compared to the other classifiers. 
Sabottke et al. [41] explored early detection of exploits using information 
available on Twitter. They proposed the design of a Twitter-based exploit detector, 
using supervised machine learning techniques. They leveraged the exploit-related 
discourse tweets on Twitter (the tweets that included ‘CVE’) and extracted information 
posted on public vulnerability resources to evaluate the chances for early detection of 
the vulnerabilities at risk of being exploited in the presence of benign and adversarial 
noise. In other words, they investigated techniques for minimizing false-positive 
detections—vulnerabilities that are not actually exploited—which is critical for 
prioritizing response actions. 
2.4.3. Optimal patch planning 
A security patch is a small program that fixes vulnerabilities. Patches usually 
get distributed to end-users to remove those vulnerabilities. Ideally, the best time to 
release a patch is the time when a vulnerability appears. However, the development and 
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distribution of patches involves considerable expenses for vendors. Additionally, a 
poorly designed patch may lead to introducing new issues. Thus, many of the vendors 
tend to release patches for their products in a pre-designed timeline [1].  
Zheng et al. [48] presented a method for quantifying a security attribute called 
mean time to security failure (MTTSF) of a virtual machine-based (VM-based)  
intrusion tolerant system [49] based on queueing theory. They also presented a 
generalized scheme for tolerating intrusions in a VM-based intrusion tolerant system. 
In 2016, Luo et al. [50] discussed the patch release strategy from the perspective of 
vendors by cost criteria. The model assumed a non-homogeneous Poisson process 
(NHPP) as the number of vulnerabilities discovered, and formulated the expected total 
cost by considering the damage of exploiting vulnerabilities before and after a patch 
release. Some researchers have focused on proposing methods according to the cost of 
security breaches [51]; finding a cost function for vulnerabilities has remained a 
controversial topic.  
2.5. Guidelines for Vulnerability Discovery Models 
Security decision makers often use public data sources to help make better 
decisions regarding, for example, what security products to choose, check for security 
trends, and estimate when new vulnerabilities that affect their installations will be 
publicly reported. Several studies have applied software reliability models (SRMs) and 
vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) to estimate times between public reports of 
vulnerabilities [1], [3], [5]–[8]. 
Few studies have tried to provide a guideline about which model should be used 
in a given situation. Joh et al. [25] investigated the relationship between the 
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performance of five S-shaped VDMs (i.e., AML, Weibull, Gamma, Normal, and Beta) 
and the skewness in vulnerability datasets for eight software. Their results showed that 
Gamma-based VDM, which is a right-skewed VDM, always yields better results with 
positively skewed (right-skewed) datasets than other models in terms of goodness of 
fit results and prediction capabilities. For the other VDMs used, no significant 
correlation was observed. In addition, the authors showed that the AML model 
performs better than some right-skewed VDMs in terms of prediction when the 
vulnerability discovery datasets are asymmetrical.  
Massacci et al. [24] proposed an empirical methodology that evaluates the 
performance of VDMs in terms of goodness of fit and predictability. They evaluated 
most existing VDMs (AT, Rescorla’s models, AML, Weibull, Linear) on 30 major 
releases of four web browsers (i.e., IE, Firefox, Chrome, Safari). They also classified 
the age of a browser’s version in three different periods: youth (within 6-12 months 
since release date), middle age (12-36 months since release date), and old age (beyond 
30 months). Based upon their findings, for a young software, the linear model yielded 
the best results for estimating the vulnerabilities in the next 3-6 months. For middle-
aged browsers the AML model was selected as the best model.  
Regarding modeling exploited vulnerabilities, one aspect consists of the 
probabilistic examination of intrusions by [52], [53]. The lack of data is a significant 
barrier to modeling exploited vulnerabilities using current VDMs or the machine 





Chapter 3: Datasets and Models  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will introduce the datasets used in this thesis. Then, we will 
present two groups of VDMs used for our analysis based upon the classification 
provided in [24]: S-shaped vulnerability discovery models (VDMs), and non S-shaped 
VDMs.  
3.2 Vulnerability Dataset Creation 
The data used in this research has been collected from six different vulnerability 
data sources including the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)7 maintained by 
NIST, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database8, the CVE Details 
data source9, the Security database10, the SecurityFocus data source11, and the 
CXSecurity database12. All the datasets we used here, derived from those three 
databases, we previously introduced in Chapter 2.  
We used the data generated by a security tool called “VepRisk”13, which has a 
backend modules that mine, extract, and store data from public repositories of 
vulnerabilities. We then stored the data in our own database using MySQL, and 
identified each vulnerability by its Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) 
identifier. We used the CVE identifier to compare the reporting date of each 










vulnerability in NVD, with the dates in other public repositories on vulnerabilities. We 
then updated the reporting date on our database to the earliest date that a given 
vulnerability was known in any of these databases. 
We used the NVD as the backbone of comparisons because it includes all the 
vulnerabilities that can be found in some of the other data sources. Even though some 
information might be missing in the NVD, it includes the fields that allows to search 
for the missing information in the other data sources. One example is the Common 
Platform Enumeration (CPE) identifier, which is only present in the NVD but can be 
used in combination with the CVE identifier to extract information from different 
sources. Another example is the vulnerability type that is only present in the CVE 
Details table.   
Vulnerability databases might have high uncertainty regarding some variables 
associated with the reported vulnerabilities such as published dates. Even though we 
tried to overcome this issue by collecting vulnerability data from several sources and 
filtering the published dates based upon the earliest date a vulnerability reported, we 
should be aware of the uncertain nature of the reported published dates. Regarding that, 
all the conclusions we draw from this research and their validity are limited by our 
database uncertainties.   
3.3 Vulnerability Dataset Overview 
It is important to have a high number of vulnerabilities for each of our analyses. 
Thus, we decided to focus on two groups: operating systems (OSs) and web browsers. 
More specifically, we selected four OSs (Windows, Mac, IOS, and Linux) and four 
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web browsers (Internet Explorer, Safari, Firefox, and Chrome). The results presented 
in this thesis include the vulnerabilities until the end of 2018.  
3.3.1 Operating systems 
We focused on vulnerabilities reported for four well-known OSs: Windows 
(1995-2018), Mac (1997-2018), IOS (the OS associated with Cisco) (1992-2018), and 
Linux (1994-2018). We chose these OSs as they are most widely used, and had the 
highest number of vulnerabilities. The start dates indicate the first vulnerability 
occurrence for the specific OS. For each OS, we included all the vulnerabilities reported 
for any of its versions. For instance, all the vulnerabilities reported for mac_os, 
mac_os_server, mac_os_x, and mac_os_x_server were put together to create a 
vulnerability database for Mac. We did this to have a high number of vulnerabilities 
for each OS. The total number of distinct vulnerabilities (unique CVE-IDs) for these 
OSs is 12,852. Table I presents the number of vulnerabilities for the four OSs. 
3.3.2 Web browsers 
We focused on the vulnerabilities reported for four well-known web browsers: 
Internet Explorer (1997-2018), Safari (2003-2018), Firefox (2003-2018), and Chrome 
(2008-2018). These browsers were selected since they are widely used and had the 
highest number of vulnerabilities. The start dates indicate the first vulnerability 
occurrence for the specific web browser. Similar to what we did for OSs, we 
considered, for each browser, all the vulnerabilities reported for any of its versions. As 
an example, all the vulnerabilities reported for ie, ieexplorer, and ie_for_macintosh 
were combined under Internet Explorer. This allowed us to have a high number of 
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vulnerabilities for each browser. The total number of vulnerabilities for these browsers 
is 6,546. Table 1 presents the number of vulnerabilities for the four browsers. 
Table 1: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER SOFTWARE 
OS Windows Mac IOS Linux 
# Vulnerabilities 3434 2908 698 5812 
Web Browsers IE Safari Firefox Chrome 
# Vulnerabilities 1862 994 1784 1906 
 
3.4 Datasets Characterization 
In this section, we characterize the datasets using well-known statistical 
indicators. Distributions are characterized by their first four moments and indicators 
like skewness and kurtosis highlight distribution properties. In this section, we will 
characterize the datasets based on their skewness since this indicator is widely used by 
the vulnerability modeling community [22], [25]. The skewness of a 
dataset/distribution specifies its degree of asymmetry around its expected value [25]. 
The skewness values are calculated via following equation [40]: 
𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =
𝑛






                                          (1) 
where n is the number of data points, 𝑥𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ data value, ?̅? represents the mean 
value and s is the standard deviation. For a given distribution with an absolute skewness 
value of greater than 1, between 0.5 and 1, and less than 0.5, the distribution is highly 
skewed, moderately skewed, and approximately symmetric, respectively [40]. The 
datasets with an absolute value greater than 0.5 and positive skewness values are called 
right-skewed datasets and referred to those datasets where more vulnerabilities are 
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reported later in the product lifecycle, and vice versa. Figure 1 shows an overall shape 
of the vulnerability discovery process with different skewness values.  
 
 Overall view of a distribution with (a) negative skewness, (b) appoximately zero skewness, and (c) 
positive skewness14  
Table 2 presents the skewness value of each software used in this research. All 
the datasets are right-skewed (each has a positive skewness value with an absolute 
value of skewness greater than 0.5). In other words, for a software with a right-skewed 
dataset, plots of the number of discovered vulnerabilities associated with the software 
grouped by time blocks lead to a significant number of vulnerabilities on the left side 
of the plot.  
Table 2: SKEWNESS VALUES PER SOFTWARE 
OS Windows Mac IOS Linux 
# Skewness 2.381 2.459 3.687 3.589 
Web Browsers IE Safari Firefox Chrome 
# Skewness 2.705 3.381 11.00 1.973 
3.5 S-shaped Vulnerability Discovery Models 
S-shaped VDMs, which measure the total number of detected vulnerabilities, 
divide the process of vulnerability discovery into three phases as shown in Figure 2. 
                                                 
14 H. Joh and Y. K. Malaiya, “Modeling Skewness in Vulnerability Discovery: Modeling Skewness in Vulnerability Discovery,” 
Qual. Reliab. Eng. Int., vol. 30, no. 8, pp. 1445–1459, Dec. 2014. 
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Phase 1 represents the learning phase, which starts from the introduction of the software 
and continues until the beginning of the linear phase as a consequence of increasing 
popularity of the software [25]. During the learning phase, the vulnerability discovery 
intensity function is an increasing function. Phase 2 or the linear phase is the period 
when most of the vulnerabilities are detected. The intensity function associated with 
the vulnerability discovery process of this phase is constant. Phase 3 or the saturation 
phase is the period when most of the vulnerabilities have been discovered and only a 
few vulnerabilities remain undiscovered [24]. The vulnerability discovery intensity 
function for the saturation phase is decreasing. Note that the saturation phase might not 
be observable for all software. This phase will not appear as long as a significant 
number of vulnerabilities are still undetected. The S-shaped VDMs used in this research 
are not distributions. They are built based upon well-known distributions and their 
purpose is to count the total number of vulnerabilities [24]. Regarding this, for all the 
models we used in this study, we only applied their cumulative forms Ω(𝑡) on 
vulnerability data. For each software, the variable we are predicting is the cumulative 
number of vulnerabilities reported in 30 days’ time intervals. In other words, t is 
associated with 30 day intervals and  Ω  represents the cumulative number of 
vulnerabilities reported within each interval.  
We use the model skewness to select the S-shaped VDMs in this research. We 
selected five S-shaped VDMs: one right-skewed model (Gamma-based VDM), one 
flexible-skewed model (Weibull-based VDM), and two symmetrical models 
(Alhazmi–Malaiya Logistic (AML) model and Normal distribution-based model). 
These VDMs were selected because they are the most well-known right-skewed, 
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flexible-skewed, and symmetrical distribution-based VDMs in modeling the 
vulnerability discovery process. We detail in the following sections these five models. 
 Three phases for S-shaped models 
3.5.1. Gamma-based VDM 
The Gamma-based VDM, derived from the Gamma distribution, belongs to the 
family of right-skewed distributions. It has a continuous intensity function with three 
parameters: α (shape parameter), β (scale parameter), and 𝛾, which represents the total 
number of vulnerabilities that would finally be discovered. The vulnerability discovery 
rate/intensity function, ω, for the Gamma-based VDM as well as its cumulative model 
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This distribution is only defined for t >0. The shape and the scale parameters 
are always positive. It is expected that for the software with large values of t, right-
skewed distributions provide better fits to vulnerability discovery data than other 
models [25] because of gradual reduction in the number of discovered vulnerabilities, 
which yields a tail on the right side of the relevant vulnerability discovery intensity 
function. 
3.5.2 Weibull-based VDM 
The Weibull-based VDM, derived from the Weibull distribution, belongs to the 
family of flexible-skewed distributions. This VDM was first introduced in 2007 [22]. 
The vulnerability discovery rate/intensity function, ω, for the Weibull-based VDM as 















                                                              (4) 






}                                                                  (5) 
Like the Gamma-based VDM, the Weibull-based VDM has a continuous 
intensity function with three parameters: α (shape parameter), β (scale parameter), and 
𝛾 which represents the total number of vulnerabilities that would finally be discovered. 
This VDM can be symmetrical with zero skewness for α values around 3. For α <3, 
this VDM is always right-skewed, while for α >3, it is left-skewed. Like the Gamma-
based VDM, this distribution is defined for t >0.  
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3.5.3 AML VDM 
Alhazmi–Malaiya Logistic (AML) model belongs to the family of distributions 
with symmetrical intensity (rate) functions. This model was first introduced in 2005 [8] 
and is based upon the idea that as an operating system gains market share, the attention 
it receives increases. Then, after experiencing a peak, it starts decreasing when a newer 
version is released. Overall, the AML model assumes the cumulative number of 
vulnerabilities is influenced by two factors: the share of the installed base (increasing 
factor) and the number of remaining undiscovered vulnerabilities (declining factor). 
The AML model has three parameters including a constant C. Parameters A and B are 
empirical constants and directly estimated from the dataset. B stands for the total 
number of vulnerabilities that would finally be discovered. This model is defined for 
time values t from the negative infinity to the positive infinity, and the parameters must 
be positive. The vulnerability discovery rate/ intensity function (ω) for the AML VDM 
as well as its cumulative model (Ω) presented in (6) and (7), respectively. 




                                                             (7) 
3.5.4 Normal-based VDM 
The Normal-based VDM belongs to the family of distributions with 
symmetrical intensity/probability density functions. This model presents a distribution 
with zero skewness that has three parameters: μ is a location parameter, σ is a scale 
parameter and 𝛾 is the total number of vulnerabilities that would eventually be 
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discovered. The vulnerability discovery rate/intensity function (ω) for the Normal-
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                                                               (9) 
The Normal-based VDM has lighter tails on both sides in comparison to the 
logistic distribution used for the AML model. For a dataset with fewer vulnerabilities 
discovered at the beginning and at the end of a discovery process, the Normal VDM 
might be a better fit than the AML model [25]. 
3.5.5 Younis Folded VDM 
 The normal distribution is symmetric around its mean and is defined for a 
random variable that takes values from -inf to +inf. In some cases, a distribution is 
needed that has no negative values. Folded distributions are kinds of asymmetrical 
models obtained by folding the negative values into the positive side of the distribution. 
The folded distribution has been found usable in industrial practices such as 
measurement of flatness and straightens. 
In the Younis folded VDM [54] vulnerability discovery starts at time t = 0 
which corresponds to the release time of the software. In this model, t represents the 
calendar time, 𝜏 is a location parameter, σ is a scale parameter, and 𝛾 represents the 
number of vulnerabilities that will be eventually discovered. The second term in its 
cumulative Ω(𝑡) equation (13) represents the part of the distribution folded to the 
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positive side, which shows the discovery process for the Folded VDM. In the equation 
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)}                                   (13) 
Compared to AML, the Folded VDM has shorter learning phase or missing 
learning phase which makes the normal distribution asymmetric. It results in a higher 
discovery rate at the beginning which may be especially applicable to the cases where 
the vulnerability discovery plot is in linear phase even at the beginning. 
3.6 Non-S-shaped Vulnerability Discovery Models 
In addition to the S-shaped models described in Section 3.5, we also considered 
several VDMs that are not S-shaped and cannot be characterized solely by their 
skewness (note: we used the classification presented in [24]). These models are Power-
law, Rescorla Quadratic (RQ), and Rescorla Exponential (RE).  
3.6.1 Power-law Software Reliability Growth Models (SRGM-based) 
Research has been conducted to find a link between the fault discovery process 
of a software and the discovery process of its vulnerabilities for modeling purposes [4]. 
When considering the fault detection process of a software, it is justifiable to conclude 
that software reliability growth models (SRGMs) and vulnerability discovery models 
(VDMs) are similar [1]. In such cases, the intensity/rate function can represent the 
detection rate of vulnerabilities.  
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When modeling the cumulative number of failures Ω(𝑡) for software reliability 
evaluations, models derived from a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) are 
often used. Allodi [55] showed that the vulnerability exploitation may follow a Power-
law distribution. However, such models have several assumptions. The main one is that 
the number of detected vulnerabilities follows a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. In 
addition, if we consider a software as a repairable system, its intensity function ω(t) =
dE[Ω(t)]/dt, is often, for simplicity, assumed a monotonic function of t. Therefore, in 
NHPP-based software reliability growth models (SRGMs) or NHPP-based VDMs, the 
intensity function (the detection rate of software errors/the detection rate of 
vulnerabilities) is considered to be a monotonic function [56]. The equations associated 
with the Power-law model are presented in (10) and (11), respectively. This model is 









                                                              (10) 
Ω(𝑡) = (𝛽−𝛼). 𝑡𝛼                                                                (11) 
3.6.2 Rescorla Exponential (RE) 
Rescorla’s models are simple exponential and quadratic models that are 
commonly used and first were introduced by Rescorla in vulnerability analysis area [7]. 
In equation (14) 𝛾 represents the number of vulnerabilities that will be eventually 
discovered, and 𝜆 represents the detection rate of software errors/the detection rate of 
vulnerabilities.   
Ω(𝑡) = 𝛾(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)                                                (14) 
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3.6.3 Rescorla Quadratic (RQ) 
Equation (15) is a simple quadratic model introduced by Rescorla [7]. 




+ 𝐵𝑡                                                   (15) 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we introduced the datasets used in this thesis. We presented the 
models used for our analysis in two categories of S-shaped VDMs, and non S-shaped 
VDMs. In the next chapter, we will apply these models on the vulnerability datasets 
and compare their curve-fitting and prediction capabilities.
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Chapter 4: Non Cluster-based Vulnerability Assessment 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will apply the VDMs introduced in Chapter 3 on the 
vulnerability datasets associated with the operating systems and web browsers also 
introduced in Chapter 3. Then, we will compare the curve-fitting and prediction 
capability of these models and will investigate which models perform better in a given 
situation. Finally, we will present some guidelines to model vulnerability discovery 
data based upon common VDMs. 
4.2 Motivation 
Among the research conducted on vulnerability modeling, few studies have 
tried to provide a guideline about which model should be used in a given situation. In 
other words, assuming the vulnerability data is provided, the research question 
addresses the following. Is there any features in the vulnerability data that could be 
used for identifying the most appropriate models for that dataset? What models are 
more accurate for vulnerability discovery process modeling?   
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:  
-We compare the curve fitting and prediction capabilities of eight VDMs (i.e. 
one right-skewed distribution-based model, one flexible-skewed distribution-based 
model, three symmetric distribution-based models, one Power-law model,  one 




- We present some guidelines to model vulnerability discovery data based upon 
common VDMs. 
- Based upon our findings from estimation results, we show that the Gamma-
based VDM was the most accurate model for the datasets by being better in 62.5% of 
the cases.  
- We also show that based upon our findings from prediction results, the Power-
law model provides most accurate predictions for the datasets by performing better than 
other models in 62.5% of the cases.  
4.3 Analysis 
For each software, the variable we used in this research is the cumulative 
number of vulnerabilities reported in 30 days’ time intervals. In other words, we splitted 
the study period associated with a given software into intervals of 30 days, and counted 
the total number of vulnerabilities detected in each interval. Then, we accumulated the 
total number of detected vulnerabilities for each interval. For curve fitting, the eight 
models were fitted to the eight datasets (for the four OSs and the four web browsers) 
using a regression method described in [24]. To avoid overfitting, 10-fold cross 
validation was also conducted using Python’s sklearn library [57]. The analysis of the 
prediction capability is done for 2016, 2017, and 2018. During the training period 
(before 2016), all the available data was used to estimate model parameters. The 
estimated final values for each interval produced by the eight models were compared 
with the actual number of vulnerabilities to calculate the prediction accuracy. 
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4.3.1 Curve-fitting error indicators 
We applied the Chi-square (χ2) goodness of fit test [24] to see how well each 









where 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑂𝑖 are the simulated and real observed values at 𝑖
𝑡ℎ interval, respectively. 
N is the number of observations. For the fit to be acceptable, the corresponding χ2 
critical value should be greater than the χ2 statistic for the given alpha level and degrees 
of freedom. We selected an alpha level of 0.05. The null hypothesis indicates that the 
actual distribution is well described by the fitted model. Hence, if the p-value of the χ2 
test is below 0.05, then the fit will be considered unsatisfactory. A p-value closer to 1 
indicates a better fit. 
R2 is another fitting statistic used in regression analysis [58]. A R2 value close 
to 1 indicates a good fit. R2 values are usually used in linear regression analysis [59] 
and might lead to some inaccuracy problem in the case of non-linear regression 
analysis. However, since this metric has been used in previous studies, we decided to 
also calculate it so that our results could be compared with these studies. 
The root mean square error (RMSE) is often used in research to calculate fitting 
errors. However, Mentaschi et al. [60] showed that for some applications (e.g., high 
fluctuation of real data) the lower values of RMSE are not always a reliable indicator 
of the accuracy of simulations. Hence, a corrected estimator HH was proposed by 
Hanna and Heinold [61]: 
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𝐻𝐻 =  √






                                                               (17) 
where 𝑆𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ simulated data, 𝑂𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ observation and N is the number of 
observations (the time blocks used for simulation). The closer to zero HH is, the more 
accurate the model. 
4.3.2 Prediction error indicators 
We calculated two normalized predictability measures, average error (AE) and 
average bias (AB) [25]. AE is a measure of how well a model predicts throughout the 
test phase, and AB indicates the general bias of the model, which assesses its tendency 
to overestimate or underestimate the number of discovered vulnerabilities. AE and AB 



















                                                       (19) 
where n is a total number of intervals (one per recorded detection date) over the 
prediction period, and Ω is the actual number of total vulnerabilities, whereas Ω𝑡 is the 
estimated number of total vulnerabilities at time t. AB can be positive (for 
overestimation) or negative (for underestimation), while AE is always positive. 
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4.4 Curve-Fitting Results 
The eight models were fitted to the eight datasets (for the four OSs and the four 
web browsers) using a regression method described in [24]. To avoid overfitting, 10-
fold cross validation was also conducted using Python’s sklearn library [57]. In each 
case, the model that has the smallest value of HH is selected as the best fitting model 
and highlighted in green. If the HH values of two models were equal, we used the 
RMSE values to differentiate them. The model with a higher value of RMSE becomes 
the second best model, and highlighted in yellow. For models with equal HH and 
almost equal RMSE (difference<=0.001), both models were highlighted in green. 
4.4.1 Operating systems 
The data and the fitted curves for the OSs are shown in Figure 3. Table 3 
contains the χ2 goodness of fit test p-values, the values of R2, RMSE and HH for the 
four OSs.  
For the OSs, the Power-law model is only statistically sound with p-values greater than 
0.05 for Linux. All the other VDMs are each significant in two cases. When comparing 
HH values for Windows, IOS, and Linux, we observe that Gamma-based and Weibull-
based VDMs performed as well as the Power-law model. However, for Windows and 























































    




For Windows, the YF VDMs provides the best fit since it has smallest HH and 
RMSE values as well as p-values greater than 0.05. For Mac, the Gamma and Weibull-
based VDMs as well as Power-law model and YF VDM led to statistically sound fits. 
However, the Gamma-based VDM was selected as the best fit due to HH and RMSE 
values lower than the other models. For IOS, all the models except RQ are statistically 
sound. The models with smaller fitting errors (AML and Normal-based VDMs) were 
selected as the best fits. For Linux, like Windows and IOS, all the models except RE 
and YF are statistically sound. However, the Gamma and Weibull-based VDMs as well 
as the Power-law have smallest HH values and relatively equal RMSEs. Thus, they are 
the most accurate fits.  
In addition, from Figure 3 we found that for the considered OSs, the 
vulnerability discovery intensity function is still increasing. These software appear to 
be in phase 2 (cf. Figure 2) and many vulnerabilities in these products are yet to be 
discovered. 
Table 3: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR OSS 
 Windows  Mac 
 p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH  p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.686 0.998 38.549 0.033  0.193 0.993 52.139 0.061 
Weibull 0.936 0.998 33.010 0.028  0.703 0.991 57.979 0.068 
AML 0.956 0.999 30.643 0.026  0.001 0.988 67.885 0.080 
Normal 0.956 0.999 30.704 0.026  0.001 0.987 68.033 0.080 
Power-law 0.466 0.994 59.757 0.051  0.058 0.984 76.679 0.090 
RE 0.026 0.983 102.871 0.088  0.000 0.968 108.229 0.128 
RQ 0.888 0.995 58.298 0.050  0.002 0.988 67.651 0.080 
YF 0.200 0.999 27.002 0.023  0.193 0.990 60.709 0.071 
 IOS  Linux 
 p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH  p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.981 0.995 9.727 0.054  0.640 0.985 105.371 0.085 
Weibull 0.981 0.995 9.379 0.052  0.640 0.985 105.264 0.085 
AML 0.990 0.997 7.391 0.041  0.630 0.977 129.095 0.105 
Normal 0.990 0.997 7.403 0.041  0.630 0.977 129.338 0.105 
Power-law 0.642 0.995 9.357 0.052  0.640 0.985 105.234 0.085 
RE 0.150 0.998 9.044 0.053  0.006 0.983 110.346 0.089 
RQ 0.000 0.973 22.993 0.128  0.222 0.985 105.901 0.086 




4.4.2 Web browsers 
The data and the fitted curves for the web browsers, are shown in Figure 4. 
Table 4 contains the χ2 goodness of fit test p-values, the values of R2, RMSE and HH 
for the four web browsers.  
For IE, all the models are statistically sound and YF has the lowest HH value. 
Thus, it was selected as the best fit. For Safari, although all the models except RE are 
statistically sound, Gamma-based VDM provided a better fit than other models based 
on the HH values. For Firefox, Gamma-based VDMs is the best model since they have 
p-values greater than 0.5 and smaller fitting error (HH and RMSE) than the other 
models. For Chrome, Gamma-based VMD provided the best fit due to having the 
smallest HH and RMSE values.  
 
Table 4: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS 
 IE  Safari 
 p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH  p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.624 0.977 50.137 0.098  0.245 0.993 17.915 0.056 
Weibull 0.624 0.978 50.051 0.098  0.739 0.993 18.945 0.059 
AML 0.403 0.975 53.035 0.104  0.050 0.991 21.297 0.066 
Normal 0.403 0.975 53.151 0.104  0.050 0.991 21.365 0.066 
Power-law 0.624 0.978 50.041 0.098  0.378 0.984 27.731 0.086 
RE 0.403 0.983 53.307 0.099  0.012 0.969 38.621 0.121 
RQ 0.624 0.978 59.149 0.099  0.549 0.984 27.413 0.085 
YF 0.285 0.983 44.100 0.086  0.986 0.992 19.629 0.061 
 Firefox  Chrome 
 p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH  p-value 𝑹𝟐 RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.378 0.998 18.683 0.028  0.368 0.998 20.094 0.036 
Weibull 0.307 0.998 18.826 0.029  0.368 0.994 32.551 0.059 
AML 0.250 0.993 34.519 0.053  0.690 0.995 29.213 0.053 
Normal 0.250 0.993 34.630 0.053  0.690 0.995 29.415 0.053 
Power-law 0.307 0.998 20.032 0.031  0.240 0.962 83.910 0.153 
RE 0.115 0.992 36.779 0.056  0.000 0.937 107.974 0.199 
RQ 0.193 0.996 24.914 0.038  0.000 0.973 70.106 0.127 




















































    






In Figure 4, the vulnerability data associated with IE and Chrome show a 
saturation phase by the end of the learning phase, which means their discovery intensity 
function has a decreasing trend at the end (i.e., the rate of discovery of new 
vulnerabilities is predicted to decrease). Thus, these products appear to be in the 
saturation phase (cf. Figure 2). For Safari, and Firefox, the discovery intensity functions 
are increasing and constant, respectively. 
4.3.4 Summary of Estimation Results 
Overall, in terms of curve fitting, considering the OSs, Gamma and YF VDMs 
were the best models in 50% of the cases, while the Weibull-based VDM and Power-
law model were the best models in 25% of the cases. Considering the web browsers, 
Gamma-based VDM provided the best fits in 75% of the cases, whereas the YF VDM 
was the best model in 25% of the cases. The other VDMs were better in none of the 
cases. However, considering the OSs and the web browsers (8 cases), Gamma, Weibull, 
AML, Normal, Power law, RE, RQ, and YF performed well in 5 (62.5%), 1(12.5%), 
0(0%), 0(0%), 1(12.5%), 0(0%), 0(0%), and 3(37.5%) cases, respectively. 
Therefore, based upon our findings from estimation results, the Gamma-based 
VDM was the most accurate model for the datasets we analyzed.  
4.5 Prediction Results 
The analysis of the prediction capability is initiated after two-thirds of the time 
period from the beginning of the vulnerability discovery process. During the training 
period, all the available data was used to estimate model parameters. The estimated 
final values for each 30-day interval produced by the eight models were compared with 
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the actual number of vulnerabilities to calculate the prediction accuracy. The model 
that has the smallest value of AE and p-value≥0.05 was selected as having the best 
prediction capability and is highlighted in green. Regarding p-values, we used * to 
show the models with p<0.05. If the AE values of two models were equal, we selected 
the best model based upon the AB and HH values. The model with a higher bias or HH 
was selected as the second best model and is highlighted in yellow.  
4.5.1 Operating systems 
The normalized error values ((Ω𝑡 − Ω)/Ω) for the OSs are shown in Figure 5. 
Table 5 presents the values of AE, AB, R2 and HH for the four OSs in our study. 
Comparing prediction capabilities for Windows, we found that the Power-law model 
has the smallest AE, AB, R2, and HH values.  
Table 5: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR OSS 
 Windows  Mac 
 AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH  AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH 
Gamma 0.063 -0.061 271.445 0.095  0.218 -0.218 595.482 0.263 
Weibull 0.091 -0.091 367.988 0.131  0.233 -0.233 640.863 0.287 
AML 0.138 -0.138 511.292 0.187  0.278* -0.278 761.332 0.351 
Normal 0.138 -0.138 511.292 0.187  0.278* -0.278 761.328 0.351 
Power-law 0.037 0.025 119.646 0.040  0.074 -0.074 198.921 0.080 
RE 0.106* 0.106 314.463 0.100  0.024* 0.017 95.639 0.037 
RQ 0.039 0.030 125.961 0.042  0.082* -0.082 221.121 0.090 
YF 0.114 -0.114 438.161 0.158  0.256 -0.256 703.498 0.320 
 IOS  Linux 
 AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH  AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH 
Gamma 0.018 0.000 15.316 0.025  0.268 -0.268 1382.822 0.354 
Weibull 0.019 0.005 17.105 0.027  0.267 -0.267 1378.715 0.352 
AML 0.076 0.076 57.333 0.088  0.272 -0.272 1423.009 0.366 
Normal 0.076 0.076 57.332 0.088  0.272 -0.272 1423.002 0.366 
Power-law 0.019 0.006 17.366 0.028  0.267 -0.267 1377.862 0.352 
RE 0.131 0.131 98.947 0.148  0.190* -0.190 987.650 0.239 
RQ 0.154* -0.154 98.230 0.172  0.278 -0.278 1431.530 0.369 
YF 0.092 0.092 70.902 0.108  0.240* -0.240 1248.693 0.313 
 
For Mac, the Power-law model has the smallest values of AE, AB and HH. For 
IOS, the Gamma-based VDM has the smallest value of AE. For Linux, the Weibull-
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based VDM and Power-law model have the best results. Note that in Table 5 negative 




 Normalized prediction error values for the models (OSs) 
4.5.2 Web browsers 
The normalized error values ((Ω𝑡 − Ω)/Ω) associated with the web browsers 
are shown in Figure 6. Table 6 presents the values of AE, AB, R2 and HH for the four 
web browsers in our study. For IE, YF VDM had the smallest error values. For Safari, 
the Power-law model had the smallest prediction error values. For Firefox, Weibull-
based VDM provided the best prediction capabilities. For Chrome, the power-law 




Table 6: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS 
 IE  Safari 
 AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH  AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH 
Gamma 0.234 -0.234 402.761 0.273  0.156 -0.156 159.467 0.201 
Weibull 0.233 -0.233 400.858 0.272  0.187 -0.187 190.325 0.245 
AML 0.157 -0.157 270.708 0.175  0.231 -0.231 228.863 0.304 
Normal 0.157 -0.157 270.706 0.175  0.231 -0.231 228.863 0.304 
Power-law 0.233 -0.233 400.719 0.271  0.030 0.026 32.144 0.037 
RE 0.149 -0.149 255.874 0.164  0.133* 0.133 130.867 0.141 
RQ 0.232 -0.232 398.766 0.270  0.041 0.040 41.458 0.047 
YF 0.141 -0.141 242.287 0.155  0.211 -0.211 212.086 0.278 
 Firefox  Chrome 
 AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH  AE AB 𝑹𝟐 HH 
Gamma 0.051 0.035 103.041 0.066  0.281 -0.281 527.771 0.367 
Weibull 0.049 0.031 98.984 0.064  0.317 -0.317 590.544 0.422 
AML 0.081 -0.081 162.703 0.112  0.307 -0.307 571.317 0.405 
Normal 0.081 -0.081 162.703 0.112  0.307 -0.307 571.314 0.405 
Power-law 0.069 0.067 140.551 0.089  0.167 0.167 355.845 0.191 
RE 0.161 0.161 287.176 0.174  0.364* 0.364 776.614 0.383 
RQ 0.096 0.096 180.913 0.113  0.077* 0.077 181.493 0.102 
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4.5.4 Summary of prediction results 
Overall, in terms of prediction, considering the OSs, the Power-law model 
performed better in 3 (75%) cases. Gamma and Weibull-based VDMs provided better 
prediction results in 1 (25%), and 1 (25%) cases, respectively. Normal-based, AML, 
RE, RQ, and YF VDMs were selected in none of the cases. Considering web browsers, 
the Power-law model led to better predictions in 2 (50%), while Weibull-based VDM 
along with YF VDM each were selected as the best predictor in 1 (25%) case. However, 
considering the OSs and the web browsers together (8 cases), Gamma, Weibull, AML, 
Normal, Power law, RE, RQ, and YF VDMs provided satisfactory prediction results in 
1 (12.5%), 2 (25%), 0 (0%), 0 (0%), 5 (62.5%), 0 (0%), 0 (0%), and 1 (12.5%) cases, 
respectively.  
Then, based upon our findings from prediction results, the Power-law model 
yielded most accurate predictions for the datasets we analyzed.  
Please remember that all the conclusions we draw from this research and their 
validity are limited by our database uncertainties. 
4.6 Discussion  
Based on our results, we found that a model’s ability to provide a good fit does 
not necessarily guarantee superior prediction capabilities. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are few studies that have tried to provide guidance about which model 
should be used in a given situation. Joh et al. [25] investigated the relationship between 
the performance of five S-shaped VDMs (i.e., AML, Weibull, Gamma, Normal, and 
Beta) and the skewness in vulnerability datasets for eight software.  
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Comparing our findings with those from Joh et al. [25], in terms of prediction, 
we didn’t find any cases out of eight cases among asymmetrical datasets where the 
AML VDM performed better than right-skewed distribution models - Joh et al. [25] 
stated that AML model performs better than some right-skewed distribution models in 
terms of prediction when the vulnerability discovery datasets are asymmetrical. 
The model tendency to overestimate or underestimate the results is another 
factor, which plays an important role in the procedure of model selection. We evaluated 
the bias values (AB) and explained that the final decision is up to the researcher to 
choose the best model based upon his/her priorities. However, from a security point of 
view, it is better to choose a model, which provides more conservative prediction 
results, if it has justifiable error values. In the current study, among the models that 
were selected as the best predictors, seven models provided overestimated results. 
Other selected models underestimated the number of vulnerabilities.  
4.7 Limitations  
There are several limitations to our work that prevent us from making more 
general conclusions. One limitation is with regard to the uncertainty of the databases 
we used. Vulnerability databases usually might have some uncertainty regarding 
variables associated with the reported vulnerabilities such as published dates.  
Another limitation is associated with using SRMs (the Power-law model) as 
VDMs. Software reliability models usually assume that the time between failures 
represents total usage time of that product. What we are using is calendar time, which 
may not be a good proxy for usage. One important difference with security studies is 
the difficulty in estimating the “attacker effort” - the total amount of time that an 
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attacker spends in finding a vulnerability - which is something that is not needed in the 
context of reliability (we assume the users accidentally encounter faults that lead to 
failures, hence usage time is a good enough proxy for time between failures). A useful 
discussion of this is given in [30].   
We have used all the vulnerabilities for all the versions of the products in our 
study. While number of studies utilize vulnerability data associated with separate 
version of software (e.g. Windows 7) on which to apply VDMs, there are papers that 
consider all versions of a software together [25], [62]. The first group expects that each 
version of a given software is an independent and all around characterized item, yet 
distinguishing the sources of reliance in vulnerability data is not a simple task.   
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, we applied the models introduced in Chapter 3 on the vulnerability 
datasets associated with the operating systems and web browsers also discussed in 
Chapter 3. Then, we compared the curve-fitting and prediction capability of these 
models and investigated which models perform better in a given situation. Finally, we 
presented some guidelines for using eight common VDMs to model vulnerability 
discovery data based on a given dataset. In next chapter, we will test whether a 
clustering approach improves the accuracy of the curve-fitting/prediction results.  
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Chapter 5: Clustering 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will test whether a clustering approach improves the 
accuracy of the curve-fitting/prediction results. We will focus on how clusters were 
created for the different vulnerability datasets associated with the operating systems 
and web browsers discussed in Chapter 3 and apply the five S-shaped VDMs and three 
non-S-shaped VDMs also introduced in Chapter 3 on them. Then, we will compare the 
curve-fitting and prediction capability of these models and will investigate which 
models perform better in a given situation as well as compare them with the results 
obtained without clustering (from Chapter 4). 
5.2 Motivation 
Several studies have applied SRMs/VDMs to estimate times between public 
reports of vulnerabilities [3], [6]–[8], [17], [18]. In all the studies we are aware of, curve 
fitting or/and prediction capabilities were estimated using all the vulnerabilities 
together. We postulate that such analysis may miss some trends that apply to separate 
categories of vulnerabilities, rather than all the vulnerabilities together.  
Moreover, SRMs assume vulnerability detection to be an independent process. 
However, this process might not be independent due, for example, to the discovery of 
a new type of vulnerability that might prompt attackers to look for similar 
vulnerabilities [5]. This assumption may lead to sub-optimal predictions on the next 
reporting date of a vulnerability, or the total number of new vulnerabilities reported in 
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the next time interval. One way to mitigate these issues is to split vulnerabilities into 
separate clusters and ensure that the clusters are independent. 
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:  
 - We present an approach that uses existing clustering techniques to group 
vulnerabilities into distinct clusters, leveraging the textual information reported in these 
vulnerabilities as a basis for constructing the clusters. 
- Our approach uses existing VDMs to make predictions on the number of new 
vulnerabilities that will be discovered in a given time period for each cluster for a given 
OS/web browser; 
- Our approach also superposes the VDMs used for each cluster together into a 
single model for predicting the number of vulnerabilities that will be discovered in a 
given time period for a given OS/web browser 
- We show that, based upon our findings from prediction results, comparing 
modeling strategies, the results with clustering were more accurate by performing 
better that without clustering approach in 58% of the cases. 
5.3 Data Processing 
For each software, we included all the vulnerabilities reported for any of its 
versions. For instance, all the vulnerabilities reported for mac_os, mac_os_server, 
mac_os_x, and mac_os_x_server were put together to create a vulnerability database 
for Mac.  
To prepare the data for the clustering phase, we used text information within 
vulnerabilities reports to label the vulnerabilities. The keywords for labelling (e.g., 
denial, injection, buffer, execute) were extracted from these reports. Tables 43 and 50 
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in Appendix A show the total number of vulnerabilities as well as the number of 
labelled and non-labelled (vulnerabilities without any associated text information in the 
database) vulnerabilities for the datasets (OSs and web browsers). For the labelled 
vulnerabilities, we indicate the number and proportion of vulnerabilities associated 
with a specific keyword. Note that vulnerabilities can be labelled with more than one 
keyword.   
For cluster analysis, we need to ensure that the features (keywords) are not 
correlated. Therefore, we checked the Pearson correlation coefficient for every two 
keywords per dataset. When we found statistically significant correlation, we merged 
the correlated keywords with a title which included both terms. For instance, due to the 
high correlation of .99 (p-value<0.001, 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0) between “Execute” and “Code” for 
all the datasets, these terms were treated as “Execute Code”. The same applied for the 
keywords “SQL” and “Injection”. No other significant correlation was observed. 
Figure 7 shows the diagram of our clustering approach. 
 
 
 Diagram of the presented clustering approach 
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5.4 Clustering Method 
We used the HPCLUS (High Performance Clustering) procedure in SAS 9.4 
with the k-means and k-modes algorithms for clustering nominal input variables. This 
procedure uses the least square method in k-means to compute cluster centroids. Each 
iteration reduces the criterion (e.g., the least squared criterion for Euclidean distance) 
until convergence is achieved or the maximum iteration number is reached [63]. 
Additionally, we set our method to cluster the data based upon the associated principal 
component analysis (PCA) scores derived from the linear combinations of binary 
attributes for each dataset. PCA reduces the number of features that might be correlated 
to independent linear combinations of them [40].   
To estimate the best number of clusters the aligned box criterion (ABC) method 
was used. Among other existing methods, the cubic clustering criterion (CCC) is a 
common metric which is usually used in clustering applications to find the most 
suitable number of clusters [64]. In addition, Tibshirani et al. [65] introduced a gap 
statistics method, which leverages Monte Carlo simulation for finding the best number 
of clusters in a database. However, it has been found that the ABC method improves 
the CCC and gap statistics methods by leveraging a high-performance machine-
learning based analysis structure [63]. Within-cluster dispersion is used as an error 
measure (also called a ‘Gap’) by the ABC method [65]. In order to find the best number 
of clusters, we applied the ABC method and compared the calculated Gap values over 
a range of possible k values. The best number of clusters occurs at the maximum peak 
value in Gap (k) [63].  
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After clustering, the most frequent keywords were selected to name the clusters 
with respect to the keywords’ weights information provided in Appendix A. We 
assumed that the keywords which covered at least 60% of vulnerabilities in each cluster 
can be good representatives of relative clusters. If none of the keywords reached the 
weight threshold of 0.6 in a cluster associated with a given software, the keyword with 
greatest weight was selected as the cluster’s label. 
5.4.1 Operating systems 
We obtained 6, 6, 7, 7 clusters for Windows, Mac, IOS, and Linux, respectively. 
The list of keywords associated with each of the six / seven clusters for Windows, Mac, 
IOS, and Linux provided in Appendix A. Since none of the keywords reaches the 
weight threshold of 0.6 in the fifth cluster associated with Mac, the keyword with the 
greatest weight (Execute Code) was selected as the cluster’s label. Table 49 shows the 
cluster summaries for the OSs. All the OSs have one cluster with a similar name. There 
are also similarly named clusters within some OSs. However, after having analyzed 
their linear correlation, we did not find any significant relationship based on the 
Pearson correlation test.  
5.4.2 Web browsers 
Following the same clustering approach we explained for the OSs, we obtained 
the following number of clusters: Internet Explorer (5), Safari (3), Firefox (5), and 
Chrome (5). More details about the clusters and frequency of the keywords associated 
with are provided in Appendix A. The cluster summaries for the browsers are shown 




In repairable systems with only one type of failure, the intensity function 
ω(𝑡)=𝑑𝐸[Ω(𝑡)]/𝑑𝑡 is often assumed to be a monotonic function of t. Similarly, for most 
SRMs and VDMs, the intensity function (the detection rate of software 
errors/vulnerabilities) is considered to be a monotonic function [56].  
Let us expand the discussion for a software when there exists more than one 
type of error. When any type of error independently causes the software normal 
function to be compromised, then the superposition model represents the software 
failures. Let us assume that we are dealing with vulnerabilities classified into 
independent clusters. Considering a given model (NHPP Power-law or a distribution-
based VDM), let 𝛺𝑗(𝑡) denote the mean cumulative number of vulnerabilities from the 
𝑗𝑡ℎ cluster in (0 t], with intensity function 𝜔𝑗(𝑡|𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗) where the function form of 
𝜔𝑗(𝑡|𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗) is given and the values of the parameters 𝛼𝑗, 𝛽𝑗are unknown. It is assumed 
that the number of vulnerabilities from any 𝑗𝑡ℎ cluster 𝛺𝑗(𝑡), 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝐽 is 
independent. A process 𝛺(𝑡) = ∑ 𝛺𝑗(𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1 , which counts the total number of 
vulnerabilities in the interval (0 t] for the superposition model, is also a same-type 
model (NHPP Power-law/distribution-based model) with an intensity function 
𝜔(𝑡|𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝜔1(𝑡|𝛼1, 𝛽1) + ⋯ + 𝜔𝐽(𝑡|𝛼𝐽, 𝛽𝐽), where 𝛼 = {𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝐽} , 𝛽 = { 
𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝐽}. Since the superposition model keeps its type (all intensity functions are of 
the same type), the associated superposition model can be applicable [56]. For instance, 
considering the NHPP Power-law model, the equations become:  
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 ,    𝛼𝑗 > 0,    𝛽𝑗 > 0                          (21) 
In this chapter, we investigate the assessment results when relaxing the 
monotonicity assumption of the intensity function that is prevalent in SRMs and 
VDMs. Selecting a given VDM/SRM, we considered two approaches for each model. 
The first approach uses non-clustered data (including only the labeled vulnerabilities) 
(cf. Chapter 4). The second approach is the superposition of the same model fitted to 
the clustered data (only the labelled vulnerabilities can be used to create the clusters), 
which relaxes the monotonicity assumption of the intensity function.  
For each software, the analysis was done in two steps. First, we used the training 
data (note: the variable we used is the total number of vulnerabilities detected on 30 
days’ time interval) to find the model parameters from the process of fitting models to 
the data (clustered and non-clustered). In other words, similar to what we described in 
Chapter 4, for the vulnerability data in each cluster, we divided the time axis into 30-
day intervals (t=0 is associated with the vulnerability with the earliest published date), 
and counted the cumulative frequency of vulnerabilities detected in each interval. Non-
homogeneity of the clusters was also validated by looking at Laplace-trend test results 
provided by MiniTab 16 to see whether there were meaningful trends in clusters. 
Second, we used the estimated parameters and the models, and simulated 
corresponding mean cumulative function (MCF) (one MCF for clustered data, and one 
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for non-clustered data) over the study period. For non-clustered data, we used the 
results from Chapter 4.   
When comparing the models with clustering versus those without-clustering, 
for each software, the best approach is highlighted in green. In addition, for prediction 
results, the negative AB values are colored in red (i.e., the associated model 
underestimated the results). All the accuracy metrics, in terms of curve 
fitting/prediction, are the same than in Chapter 4. For the models that used the clustered 
data, the first and second best models are highlighted in yellow. Overall, green is used 
to indicate the best modeling approach while yellow indicates the best models among 
the models when applying clustering. 
5.6 Curve-Fitting Results 
In this section we provide the results regarding curve-fitting capabilities of the 
models (comparing the results between clustered data and non-clustered data, and 
comparing the results generated from clustering).  
5.6.1 Operating systems 
Tables 7-10 contain the Chi-square goodness of fit test for the clustering-based 
MCF and the MCF without clustering, the values of R^2, RMSE and HH for the 
vulnerabilities of the four operating systems in our study. For Windows and IOS, the 
MCF without clustering yielded more accurate results in all the cases with p-
values>0.05 because of smaller RMSE and HH values. For Mac, only in one case, the 
MCF with clustering performed better than the MCF without clustering. For Linux, the 
MCF without clustering yielded more accurate results in two cases. Besides, among the 
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models uses non-clustered data and clustered data, in five cases neither of the MCFs 
were statistically sound. We cannot compare these cases and call them as “invalid” 
cases. 
In addition, among the models with clustering, for Windows, the Gamma and 
Weibull-based VDMs provide the best fits since they have smaller HH and RMSE 
values. For Mac and IOS, the Gamma-based VDM leads to HH and RMSE values 
lower than other VDMs. For Linux, the AML and Normal-based VDMs led to the 
smallest and relatively equal HH values and provide the most accurate fits. 
Table 7: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR WINDOWS  
Estimation 
Windows 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.233 0.983 63.550 0.134 0.686 0.998 38.549 0.033 
Weibull 0.233 0.981 63.996 0.135 0.936 0.998 33.010 0.028 
AML 0.074 0.982 64.949 0.137 0.956 0.999 30.643 0.026 
Normal 0.074 0.982 64.845 0.137 0.956 0.999 30.704 0.026 
Power-law 0.098 0.990 101.389 0.202 0.466 0.994 59.757 0.051 
RE 0.000 0.980 101.425 0.220 0.026 0.983 102.871 0.088 
RQ 0.000 0.980 102.100 0.278 0.888 0.995 58.298 0.050 
YF 0.074 0.982 64.845 0.137 0.200 0.999 27.002 0.023 
Table 8: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR MAC 
Estimation 
Mac 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.058 0.985 118.583 0.236 0.193 0.993 52.139 0.061 
Weibull 0.058 0.984 121.376 0.242 0.703 0.991 57.979 0.068 
AML 0.000 0.986 121.620 0.244 0.001 0.988 67.885 0.080 
Normal 0.000 0.986 120.570 0.241 0.001 0.987 68.033 0.080 
Power-law 0.072 0.987 131.265 0.247 0.058 0.984 76.679 0.090 
RE 0.059 0.986 129.168 0.245 0.000 0.968 108.229 0.128 
RQ 0.000 0.890 150.230 0.360 0.002 0.988 67.651 0.080 
YF 0.114 0.986 121.621 0.244 0.193 0.990 60.709 0.071 
Table 9: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR IOS 
Estimation 
IOS 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.170 0.992 399.504 1.130 0.981 0.995 9.727 0.054 
Weibull 0.175 0.993 404.167 1.138 0.981 0.995 9.379 0.052 
AML 0.076 0.990 450.814 1.224 0.990 0.997 7.391 0.041 
Normal 0.076 0.991 458.197 1.237 0.990 0.997 7.403 0.041 
Power-law 0.055 0.990 405.189 1.140 0.642 0.995 9.357 0.052 
RE 0.000 0.987 410.026 1.149 0.150 0.998 9.044 0.053 
RQ 0.000 0.987 450.159 1.219 0.000 0.973 22.993 0.128 
YF 0.098 0.991 408.237 1.140 0.370 0.998 6.334 0.035 
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Table 10: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR LINUX 
Estimation 
Linux 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.371 0.994 166.381 0.167 0.640 0.985 105.371 0.085 
Weibull 0.371 0.991 129.92 0.134 0.640 0.985 105.264 0.085 
AML 0.560 0.990 104.775 0.110 0.630 0.977 129.095 0.105 
Normal 0.560 0.994 105.670 0.110 0.630 0.977 129.338 0.105 
Power-law 0.392 0.990 128.021 0.148 0.640 0.985 105.234 0.085 
RE 0.075 0.992 145.390 0.155 0.006 0.983 110.346 0.089 
RQ 0.171 0.992 147.008 0.156. 0.222 0.985 105.901 0.086 
YF 0.151 0.994 128.620 0.149 0.006 0.982 114.012 0.092 
5.6.2 Web browsers 
Tables 11-14 contain the Chi-square goodness of fit test values for the 
clustering-based MCF and the MCF without clustering, the values of R^2, RMSE and 
HH for the vulnerabilities of the four web browsers in our study. For all the cases with 
p-values>0.05, the MCF without clustering led to more accurate results than those from 
clustering-based MCFs, because of having smaller RMSE and HH values as well as 
having statistically sound p-values. Besides, among the models uses non-clustered data 
and clustered data, in three cases neither of the MCFs were statistically sound. 
In addition, among the models with clustering, for IE, the Power-law model led 
to the smallest values of HH and RMSE. For Safari, the AML and Normal-based VDMs 
provided better fits than other models. For Firefox, Gamma and Weibull-based VDMs 
are the best models since they have smaller fitting errors (HH and RMSE) than other 








Table 11: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR IE 
Estimation 
IE 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.169 0.997 65.088 0.342 0.624 0.977 50.137 0.098 
Weibull 0.469 0.997 64.970 0.341 0.624 0.978 50.051 0.098 
AML 0.012 0.997 69.876 0.372 0.403 0.975 53.035 0.104 
Normal 0.012 0.997 69.882 0.372 0.403 0.975 53.151 0.104 
Power-law 0.162 0.973 56.496 0.285 0.624 0.978 50.041 0.098 
RE 0.067 0.997 69.872 0.368 0.403 0.983 53.307 0.099 
RQ 0.000 0.990 62.805 0.285 0.624 0.978 59.149 0.099 
YF 0.529 0.997 65.079 0.341 0.285 0.983 44.100 0.086 
 
Table 12: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR SAFARI 
Estimation 
Safari 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.057 0.884 125.658 0.878 0.245 0.993 17.915 0.056 
Weibull 0.057 0.880 125.476 0.878 0.739 0.993 18.945 0.059 
AML 0.080 0.883 98.623 0.763 0.050 0.991 21.297 0.066 
Normal 0.080 0.810 96.776 0.769 0.050 0.991 21.365 0.066 
Power-law 0.080 0.92 129.947 0.887 0.378 0.984 27.731 0.086 
RE 0.052 0.91 125.250 0.884 0.012 0.969 38.621 0.121 
RQ 0.039 0.95 130.402 0.890 0.549 0.984 27.413 0.085 
YF 0.000 0.880 120.714 0.860 0.986 0.992 19.629 0.061 
 
Table 13: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR FIREFOX 
Estimation 
Firefox 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.294 0.998 22.944 0.056 0.378 0.998 18.683 0.028 
Weibull 0.294 0.998 23.704 0.058 0.307 0.998 18.826 0.029 
AML 0.115 0.996 32.155 0.080 0.250 0.993 34.519 0.053 
Normal 0.115 0.996 32.185 0.080 0.250 0.993 34.630 0.053 
Power-law 0.053 0.990 31.791 0.078 0.307 0.998 20.032 0.031 
RE 0.054 0.998 31.850 0.079 0.115 0.992 36.779 0.056 
RQ 0.000 0.996 45.291 0.155 0.193 0.996 24.914 0.038 
YF 0.113 0.990 32.001 0.080 0.150 0.996 24.543 0.037 
 
Table 14: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR CHROME 
Estimation 
Chrome 
With clustering Without clustering 
p-value R-sq RMSE HH p-value R-sq RMSE HH 
Gamma 0.137 0.998 57.890 0.123 0.368 0.998 20.094 0.036 
Weibull 0.137 0.998 60.450 0.128 0.368 0.994 32.551 0.059 
AML 0.385 0.997 62.917 0.134 0.690 0.995 29.213 0.053 
Normal 0.385 0.997 62.913 0.134 0.690 0.995 29.415 0.053 
Power-law 0.106 0.978 82.021 0.174 0.240 0.962 83.910 0.153 
RE 0.000 0.998 115.135 0.291 0.000 0.937 107.974 0.199 
RQ 0.000 0.996 81.852 0.170 0.000 0.973 70.106 0.127 




5.6.3 Summary of Curve-Fitting Results 
Overall, in terms of curve-fitting, considering the OSs, the models that were 
using non-clustered data performed better in 24 cases out of 27 valid cases (the valid 
cases are those with at least one statistically sound MCF). Considering web browsers, 
again the non-clustering approach led to more accurate results in all the valid cases (29 
cases). Considering the OSs and the web browsers together (8 cases), out of 56 valid 
cases (8 datasets * eight models per dataset – invalid models) we analyzed, in terms of 
estimation, the approach without-clustering led to more accurate results in 53 (94.6%) 
cases. 
Comparing with-clustering results together, in terms of curve fitting, out of 
eight datasets, the Gamma-based VDMs was best in five (62.5%) cases. The Weibull, 
AML, and Normal VDMs each were equally best in two (25%) cases. The Power-law 
model was most accurate in one (12.5%) case.  
Therefore, based upon our findings from estimation results, comparing 
modeling strategies, the results from the non-clustered approach were more 
accurate than those from the clustered approach. 
However, when comparing clustering results together, the Gamma-based 
VDM was the most accurate model given all the datasets we had.  
5.7 Prediction Results 
In this section, we provide the results regarding prediction capabilities of the 
models (comparing the obtained predictions with clustered data and non-clustered data, 
and comparing the results generated from the clustering approach). For each case, the 
model that has the smallest value of AE and p-value≥0.05 was selected as having the 
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best prediction capability and is highlighted in green. Regarding p-values, we used * to 
show the models with p<0.05.  
5.7.1 Operating systems 
Tables 15-18 present the values of AE, AB, R2 and HH for the four operating 
systems in our study. Eight models per software were analyzed. There are five cases 
where neither of the MCFs were statistically sound (five invalid cases). For Windows, 
in all the valid VDMs but RQ, the MCFs with clustering led to more accurate results 
compared to the MCFs without clustering. For Mac, in four cases out of five valid 
cases, the MCF with clustering led to more accurate results. For IOS, the MCFs without 
clustering led to more accurate results in all the valid cases. For Linux, for all the 
models except Gamma-based VDM, the MCFs with clustering resulted in the most 
accurate prediction results.  
In addition, comparing with-clustering, for Windows and Mac, the AML VDM 
and the YF VDM have the smallest values of AB, AE and HH, respectively. For IOS, 
the Weibull-based VDM and the Power-law model have the smallest AE values. 
However, the HH values show that the Power-law model should be selected as the first 
best model. For Linux, Weibull-based VDM has the best results. Note that negative 








Table 15: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR WINDOWS 
Prediction 
Windows 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.037 -0.037 0.96 0.060 0.063 -0.061 0.94 0.095 
Weibull 0.035 -0.045 0.97 0.049 0.091 -0.091 0.94 0.131 
AML 0.015 -0.015 0.99 0.018 0.138 -0.138 0.88 0.187 
Normal 0.021 -0.021 0.99 0.035 0.138 -0.138 0.88 0.187 
Power-law 0.035 -0.031 0.84 0.046 0.037 0.025 0.90 0.040 
RE 0.021* -0.019 0.86 0.035 0.106* 0.106 0.86 0.100 
RQ 0.033* -0.040 0.98 0.040 0.039 0.030 0.95 0.042 
YF 0.036 -0.032 0.96 0.050 0.114 -0.114 0.94 0.158 
 
Table 16: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR MAC 
Prediction 
Mac 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.080 -0.041 0.97 0.175 0.218 -0.218 0.99 0.263 
Weibull 0.061 -0.027 0.98 0.265 0.233 -0.233 0.99 0.287 
AML 0.032* 0.0194 0.99 0.234 0.278* -0.278 0.97 0.351 
Normal 0.153* -0.130 0.98 0.309 0.278* -0.278 0.97 0.351 
Power-law 1.059 1.059 0.58 0.786 0.074 -0.074 0.94 0.080 
RE 0.119 0.890 0.86 0.279 0.024* 0.017 0.97 0.037 
RQ 0.270* -0.202 0.89 0.361 0.082* -0.082 0.86 0.090 
YF 0.035 -0.035 0.98 0.236 0.256 -0.256 0.99 0.320 
 
Table 17: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR IOS 
Prediction 
IOS 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.260 -0.181 0.95 0.367 0.018 0.000 0.97 0.025 
Weibull 0.259 -0.179 0.95 0.379 0.019 0.005 0.98 0.027 
AML 0.502 -0.501 0.87 0.894 0.076 0.076 0.98 0.088 
Normal 0.598 -0.598 0.74 1.142 0.076 0.076 0.95 0.088 
Power-law 0.259 -0.179 0.90 0.365 0.019 0.006 0.87 0.028 
RE 0.492* -0.492 0.87 0.853 0.131 0.131 0.86 0.148 
RQ 0.492* -0.318 0.84 1.142 0.154* -0.154 0.86 0.172 
YF 0.263 -0.155 0.95 0.373 0.092 0.092 0.99 0.108 
 
Table 18: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR LINUX 
Prediction 
Linux 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.274 -0.274 0.95 0.398 0.268 -0.268 0.94 0.354 
Weibull 0.032 0.013 0.99 0.032 0.267 -0.267 0.74 0.352 
AML 0.142 0.091 0.98 0.132 0.272 -0.272 0.78 0.366 
Normal 0.091 0.063 0.99 0.082 0.272 -0.272 0.78 0.366 
Power-law 0.037 0.037 0.83 0.037 0.267 -0.267 0.70 0.352 
RE 0.174 -0.174 0.85 0.398 0.190* -0.190 0.95 0.239 
RQ 0.274 -0.274 0.90 0.398 0.278 -0.278 0.74 0.369 




5.7.2 Web browsers 
Tables 19-22 present the values of AE, AB, R2 and HH for the four web 
browsers in our study. Again, eight models per software were analyzed. There are two 
cases where neither of the MCFs were statistically sound (two invalid cases). For IE, 
for all the VDMs but not for the Power-law model, the MCFs without clustering led to 
more accurate results compared to the MCFs without clustering. For Safari, in all the 
VDMs but the Power-law model and RE VDM, the MCFs without clustering led to 
most accurate results. For Firefox, for all the VDMs but not for the RQ VDM, the 
MCFs with clustering led to most accurate results. For Chrome, all the MCFs with 
clustering led to the more accurate results compared to the MCFs without clustering.  
In addition, comparing with-clustering, for IE, Safari, and Firefox, the Power-
law model had the smallest error values. For Chrome, the Gamma-based VDM had the 
smallest error values. 
Table 19: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR IE 
Prediction 
IE 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.240 -0.230 0.99 0.302 0.234 -0.234 0.97 0.273 
Weibull 0.280 -0.280 0.99 0.329 0.233 -0.233 0.98 0.272 
AML 0.294* -0.294 0.99 0.347 0.157 -0.157 0.99 0.175 
Normal 0.295* -0.295 0.99 0.347 0.157 -0.157 0.99 0.175 
Power-law 0.108 0.074 0.89 0.184 0.233 -0.233 0.89 0.271 
RE 0.276 -0.276 0.97 0.326 0.149 -0.149 0.92 0.164 
RQ 0.308* -0.308 0.97 0.372 0.232 -0.232 0.88 0.270 
YF 0.240 -0.230 0.99 0.302 0.141 -0.141 0.97 0.155 
Table 20: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR SAFARI 
Prediction 
Safari 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.609 -0.609 0.79 1.126 0.156 -0.156 0.94 0.201 
Weibull 0.611 -0.611 0.79 1.134 0.187 -0.187 0.94 0.245 
AML 0.656 -0.656 0.67 1.278 0.231 -0.231 0.88 0.304 
Normal 0.656 -0.656 0.68 1.280 0.231 -0.231 0.88 0.304 
Power-law 0.023 -0.018 0.90 0.026 0.030 0.026 0.90 0.037 
RE 0.640 -0.640 0.70 1.248 0.133* 0.133 0.88 0.141 
RQ 0.640 -0.566 0.85 1.251 0.041 0.040 0.99 0.047 
YF 0.616* -0.612 0.83 1.140 0.211 -0.211 0.86 0.278 
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Table 21: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR FIREFOX 
Prediction 
Firefox 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.017 -0.017 0.99 0.026 0.051 0.035 0.99 0.066 
Weibull 0.020 -0.020 0.99 0.029 0.049 0.031 0.99 0.064 
AML 0.024 -0.024 0.98 0.023 0.081 -0.081 0.99 0.112 
Normal 0.034 -0.034 0.95 0.032 0.081 -0.081 0.98 0.112 
Power-law 0.015 0.014 0.99 0.015 0.069 0.067 0.98 0.089 
RE 0.034 -0.034 0.96 0.030 0.161 0.161 0.89 0.174 
RQ 0.075* -0.054 0.86 0.032 0.096 0.096 0.99 0.113 
YF 0.021 -0.021 0.99 0.022 0.051 -0.032 0.99 0.069 
Table 22: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR CHROME 
Prediction 
Chrome 
With clustering Without clustering 
AE AB R-sq HH AE AB R-sq HH 
Gamma 0.173 -0.173 0.99 0.167 0.281 -0.281 0.99 0.367 
Weibull 0.225 -0.225 0.98 0.215 0.317 -0.317 0.99 0.422 
AML 0.232 -0.232 0.99 0.222 0.307 -0.307 0.99 0.405 
Normal 0.232 -0.232 0.99 0.222 0.307 -0.307 0.99 0.405 
Power-law 0.324 0.324 0.94 0.345 0.167 0.167 0.94 0.191 
RE 0.298* -0.298 0.86 0.305 0.364* 0.364 0.89 0.383 
RQ 0.334* 0.324 0.94 0.345 0.077* 0.077 0.99 0.102 
YF 0.225 -0.225 0.98 0.213 0.304 -0.304 0.95 0.402 
 
5.7.3 Summary of Prediction Results 
In terms of prediction accuracy, considering the OSs, out of 27 valid cases (4 
OS and 8 models excluding invalid cases), the MCFs that used clustered data led to 
more accurate results in 17 (63%) cases than those which used non-clustered data. 
Considering web browsers, the MCFs with-clustering has most accurate results in 16 
(53.3%) cases, out of the 30 valid cases we analyzed. However, considering the OSs 
and web browsers together, out of 57 valid cases analyzed (8 software and 8 models 
excluding 7 invalid cases), in terms of prediction accuracy, the MCFs with clustering 
approach led to more accurate results in 33 (58%) cases. 
Overall,  in terms of prediction accuracy, out of 57 valid cases (eight datasets 
multiplied by eight models per dataset minus seven invalid cases), the MCF with 
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clustering led to more accurate results in 33 (58%) cases, while the MCF without 
clustering resulted in more accurate results in 24 (42%) cases.  
Comparing with-clustering results together, in terms of prediction, out of eight 
datasets, the Power-law model and the Weibull-based VDM was the most accurate in 
four (50%) and two (25%) cases, respectively. The Gamma-based, AML and YF 
VDMs each were equally best in one (12.5%) cases. The other VDMs was best in 
neither of the cases.  
Therefore, based upon our findings from prediction results, comparing 
modeling strategies, the results with clustering were more accurate for eight 
datasets we analyzed.  
Comparing with-clustering results together, in terms of prediction accuracy, the 
Power-law model was the most accurate model.  
Please remember that all the conclusions we draw from this research and their 
validity are limited by our database uncertainties. 
 
5.8 Discussion 
In this chapter, we explored the applicability of clustering to vulnerability data, 
and investigated whether this approach can lead to more accurate predictions with 
common SRMs/VDMs. Our results show that the cluster-based approach provided 
better prediction results than without clustering for our datasets. We have summarized 




Table 23: MODELING GUIDELINE 





Without Clustering With- Clustering 
fitting prediction fitting prediction 
Model Gamma Power-law Gamma Power-law 
 
5.9 Limitations  
The main limitations of this chapter are the following:  
 One limitation is with regard to the uncertainty of the databases we used. 
Vulnerability databases usually might have some uncertainty regarding 
variables associated with the reported vulnerabilities such as published dates. 
 We have only applied the approach to 8 software. We don’t know yet how well 
this works for other vulnerability datasets associated with a software, though 
we plan to extend this work in the future. Since we integrated all the 
vulnerabilities associated with multiple versions of a software and it might have 
triggered some sources of dependency, we plan to rebuild the datasets we used. 
In other words, for a given software, we will integrate the versions in which 
their source codes have reached a threshold of similarity. We will define a 
similarity metric. 
 We have applied the approach to all the vulnerabilities of a software, rather than 
subdivided by version type. This was mainly because the sample size of 
vulnerabilities get much smaller when considering individual versions. Other 
researchers have looked at individual versions separately [24]. However, we 
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believe that different versions of a software cannot be assumed completely 
independent since different versions have large overlaps in their code base.  
5.10 Summary 
In this chapter, we used a common clustering technique to group the 
vulnerabilities into distinct clusters, using the textual information reported in these 
vulnerabilities. We have applied our approach on the vulnerabilities datasets introduced 
in Chapter 3. We also investigated whether this approach could result in more accurate 
results, in terms of estimation/prediction, compared to the case where all the 
vulnerabilities estimated together (results from Chapter 3). In next chapter, we will 





Chapter 6: A Comparison of Vulnerabilities’ Grouping 
Strategies 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present some guidelines to model vulnerability discovery 
data based on two commonly employed vulnerabilities’ grouping strategies. In the first 
strategy, for each software, we analyze all vulnerabilities reported for any of its 
versions. In the second strategy, for each software, we select only versions for which 
there are most vulnerabilities shared by two subsequent versions of the product. We 
used the eight models introduced in Chapter 3 (eight common VDMs) for the discovery 
process of vulnerabilities in the eight well-known software (four operating systems and 
four web browsers) also introduced in Chapter 3. The accuracy of these models was 
investigated based on their fitting and prediction capabilities.  
6.2 Motivation 
Many studies choose all vulnerabilities when assessing product families. This 
may be difficult to justify for products with long lifespans: some of the older 
vulnerabilities have long been fixed, and the code-based of these products is likely to 
have evolved significantly. 
Other studies [24], [32] asses specific versions of products and only consider 
vulnerabilities that have been reported for those specific versions. This may be too 
restrictive as a subsequent version of the same product family is likely to share a large 
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proportion of the code base with its predecessor. Hence it is also likely to share a large 
proportion of the vulnerabilities. 
Our research question investigates whether we can improve the results by 
filtering a given vulnerability dataset associated with a product with only versions for 
which there are most vulnerabilities shared by two subsequent versions of the product. 
In other words, the question is “should we only consider the vulnerabilities associated 
with a single version of a software for our modeling or all vulnerabilities reported for 
any of its versions?”. To answer these questions, we need to consider each scenario 
separately and compare their results.  
In this chapter, we make the following contributions: 
- We use two strategies for grouping vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities merged 
for all versions and groups built based on a number of common 
vulnerabilities across versions). 
-  We apply eight common VDMs on the mentioned groups and compare 
their curve-fitting and prediction capabilities to derive a guideline. 
6.3 Grouping Strategy 
As mentioned is Chapter 3, we will analyze the reported vulnerabilities 
associated with four well-known OSs: Windows (1995-2017), Mac (1997-2017), IOS 
(the OS associated with Cisco) (1992-2017), and Linux (1994-2017), as well as four 
well-known web browsers including Internet Explorer (1997-2017), Safari (2003-
2017), Firefox (2003-2017), and Chrome (2008-2017). These software have been 
selected because they are the most widely used and have the most vulnerabilities among 
the databases.  
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For each software, we considered two grouping strategies. In the first strategy 
(St. 1), for each software, we analyze all vulnerabilities reported for any of its versions. 
Thus, for each software, all the vulnerabilities reported for any of its versions were 
included. For instance, all the vulnerabilities reported for mac_os, mac_os_server, 
mac_os_x, and mac_os_x_server were put together to create a vulnerability database 
for Mac. 
In the second strategy (St. 2), for each software, we group versions based on 
the percentage of common vulnerabilities (i.e., we group the consecutive versions with 
more than 70% common reported vulnerabilities). We assume the percentage of 
common vulnerabilities for two or more consecutive versions of a software be a good 
measure regarding the similarity of their source code. We selected 70% as a threshold 
for versions of high level of source code similarity that should be analyzed together. 
Table 24 shows the percentage of common vulnerability within some versions of 
Firefox. The threshold is met for versions 0.x, 1.x, 2.x and their associated 
vulnerabilities can be grouped together. Even though the threshold is also met for 
versions 0.x and 3.x, we do not consider them as a separate group since they are not 
consecutive versions. For the software versions that don’t satisfy this condition we only 
consider the product with the most vulnerabilities reported (e.g., Linux_Kernel).  
Table 24:  PERCENTAGE OF COMMON VULNERABILITIES WITHIN FIREFOX VERSIONS 










Firefox 0.x 1 0.94 0.79 0.71 
Firefox 1.x * 1 0.70 0.52 
Firefox 2.x * * 1 0.63 




Table 25 presents the total number of vulnerabilities for each software (All 
versions together (St. 1) and versions grouped based on the similarity threshold (St. 2)) 
as well as their skewness values. All the datasets associated with the eight software we 
analyzed are right skewed (each has a positive skewness value with an absolute value 
of skewness greater than 0.5). Safari was not considered in St. 2 since we didn’t have 
enough vulnerabilities for modeling by grouping the versions with more than 70% 
common vulnerabilities. 
Table 25: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER SOFTWARE 
OS (St.1) Windows Mac IOS Linux 
# Vulnerabilities 3100 2705 650 4745 
Skewness 2.10 2.19 3.12 3.50 
Web Browser 
(St.1) 
IE Safari Firefox Chrome 
# Vulnerabilities 1775 943 1477 1837 












# Vulnerabilities 1054 1907 317 1993 













# Vulnerabilities 667 720 677 882 










# Vulnerabilities 878 959   
Skewness 0.86 1.35   
 
6.4 Analysis 
Like what we described in Chapter 4, for the vulnerability data in each group, 
we divided the time axis into 30-day intervals (t=0 is associated with the vulnerability 
with the earliest published date), and counted the cumulative frequency of 
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vulnerabilities detected in each interval. The regression and the analysis methods we 
used described in Section 4.3.  
6.4.1 Curve-fitting error indicators 
We used the eight models for the discovery process of vulnerabilities introduced 
in Chapter 3 in eight well-known software (four operating systems and four web 
browsers). The models were fitted to the 18 datasets (8 datasets from St. 1 and 10 
datasets from St. 2) using a non-linear regression method described in [24]. Most of the 
error indicators considered in this chapter are the same than in previous chapters (χ2, 
HH). However, we added a few more indicators for better judgment between the 
models. 
The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is frequently used to make a fair 
comparison between models. It also accounts for overfitting detection by penalizing 
the models with an issue of overfitting whereas metrics like χ2 don’t have such 
capability. AIC is formally defined as: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = (−2 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑) + 2M                                (22) 
where M is the number of free parameters of the examined model. Alhazmi & Malaiya 
in [18], [21] reported the AIC values. To compare two models, we consider their 
difference:  
Δi = AIC𝑖  − AIC𝑚𝑖𝑛                                                 (23) 
where AIC𝑖 is the AIC of the i-th model, and AIC𝑚𝑖𝑛n is the lowest AIC one obtains 
among the set of models examined (i.e., the preferred model). The rule of thumb, 
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outlined in [66], is: if Δi<2 , then there is substantial support for the i-th model (or the 
evidence against it is worth only a bare mention), and the proposition that it is a proper 
description is highly probable; if 2<Δi<4, then there is strong support for the i-th model; 
if 4<Δi<7, then there is considerably less support for the i-th model; models with Δi>10 
have essentially no support. In this chapter, models with Δi<4 were selected as the best 
models. 
6.4.2 Prediction error indicators 
In addition to AE and AB, we also report %ΔAE𝑖, which represents the 
percentage of difference between the AE of the i-the model and the model with 
minimum AE 
%ΔAE𝑖 = (AE𝑖  − AE𝑚𝑖𝑛) ∗ 100                                       (24) 
where AE𝑖 is the AE of the i-th model, and AE𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the lowest AE obtained among the 
set of models examined (i.e., the best model).  
6.5 Curve-Fitting Results 
6.5.1 Operating systems 
Tables 26-27 contain the χ2 goodness of fit test p-values, HH, the AIC values, 
and Δi for the OSs (St. 1 and St. 2) and the web browsers (St. 1 and St. 2), respectively. 
In each case, the model that has the smallest values of HH and AIC is selected as the 
best fitting model and highlighted in green. The other models with Δi<4 are also 




Table 26: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR OSS (ST.1) 
 Windows  Mac 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 1.00 0.03 2914.58 0.00  1.00 0.07 6080.39 5.78 
Weibull 1.00 0.03 2916.34 1.75  1.00 0.07 6079.86 5.26 
AML 1.00 0.05 3083.02 168.43  0.99 0.08 6252.64 178.04 
Normal 1.00 0.05 3082.02 167.43  0.99 0.08 6251.64 177.04 
Power-law 1.00 0.05 3075.58 161.00  1.00 0.07 6077.50 2.90 
RE 1.00 0.08 3381.79 467.21  0.99 0.08 6165.09 90.49 
RQ 1.00 0.05 3078.25 163.66  1.00 0.07 6074.60 0.00 
YF 1.00 0.04 2967.94 53.36  0.98 0.08 6166.42 91.81 
 IOS  Linux 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 0.25 0.03 2220.06 102.65  0.46 0.119 20506.23 1036.55 
Weibull 0.43 0.03 2216.41 99.00  0.78 0.118 20493.64 1023.95 
AML 1.00 0.03 2118.41 1.00  0.47 0.108 20240.71 771.02 
Normal 1.00 0.03 2117.41 0.00  0.98 0.083 19469.69 0.00 
Power-law 0.48 0.03 2213.77 96.36  0.99 0.118 20490.83 1021.14 
RE 0.00 0.04 2288.65 171.24  0.99 0.088 19652.27 182.59 
RQ 0.00 0.07 2633.48 516.06  0.00 0.134 20856.60 1386.91 
YF 1.00 0.03 2152.12 34.71  0.99 0.088 19652.72 183.04 
Table 27: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR OSS (ST.2) 
 Windows (Vista & 7)  Mac_OS_X 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 0.99 0.07 1830.80 39.84  0.23 0.12 3236.55 77.19 
Weibull 0.99 0.07 1829.74 38.78  0.45 0.12 3235.16 75.81 
AML 0.00 0.10 1932.50 141.53  0.90 0.11 3188.84 29.49 
Normal 0.00 0.10 1931.50 140.53  0.98 0.11 3178.92 19.57 
Power-law 0.98 0.07 1827.65 36.69  0.16 0.12 3233.08 73.72 
RE 0.99 0.07 1790.96 0.00  1.00 0.10 3159.35 0.00 
RQ 0.98 0.07 1810.02 19.06  0.99 0.12 3238.09 78.74 
YF 1.00 0.07 1794.40 3.44  0.99 0.10 3164.66 5.31 
 IOS (11.x & 12.x)  Linux_Kernel 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 0.27 0.05 852.90 99.33  0.99 0.05 7325.63 73.01 
Weibull 0.72 0.04 827.59 74.01  0.99 0.05 7320.49 67.88 
AML 1.00 0.03 754.58 1.00  0.98 0.06 7389.79 137.17 
Normal 1.00 0.03 753.58 0.00  0.98 0.06 7388.79 136.17 
Power-law 1.00 0.06 923.13 169.55  0.76 0.05 7317.41 64.79 
RE 0.00 0.09 997.64 244.06  1.00 0.05 7252.62 0.00 
RQ 0.14 0.07 953.12 199.54  0.00 0.06 7568.41 315.79 
YF 1.00 0.03 762.78 9.21  1.00 0.05 7275.13 22.52 
 
For OSs (St. 1 and St. 2), in all cases, most of the models are statistically sound 
with p-values greater than 0.05. RE and RQ VDMs each resulted in unsound p-values 
in two cases. However, we cannot accept all the models with sound p-values and have 
to consider their associated Δi values. Comparing grouping strategies, in terms of curve 
fitting, the AML and Normal-based VDMs were the best models for IOS in both 
strategies. However, for other OSs, the results associated with St. 1 and St. 2 differ. 
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6.5.2 Web browsers 
Tables 28-29 contain the χ2 goodness of fit test p-values, HH, the AIC values, 
and Δi for the web browsers (St. 1 and St. 2) and the web browsers (St. 1 and St. 2), 
respectively. 
For web browsers (St. 1), most of the models still have statistically sound p-
values. However, this is not true for web browsers (St. 2). Comparing the grouping 
strategies, there is no common best model within Chrome (St. 1) and Chrome (3.x, 4.x). 
Comparing grouping strategies, in terms of curve fitting, for Chrome and one of its 
subversions (Chrome 3.x &4.x), the Gamma-based VDM was the best common model 
using both strategies. 
 
 
Table 28: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS (ST.1) 
 IE  Safari 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 1.00 0.12 4906.01 293.35  1.00 0.06 1598.98 0.00 
Weibull 1.00 0.12 4903.48 290.82  1.00 0.07 1610.80 11.82 
AML 1.00 0.09 4666.23 53.57  0.99 0.09 1716.48 117.49 
Normal 1.00 0.08 4612.66 0.00  0.99 0.09 1715.48 116.49 
Power-law 0.99 0.12 4901.34 288.68  1.00 0.07 1629.14 30.16 
RE 1.00 0.09 4639.14 26.48  0.99 0.10 1750.82 151.84 
RQ 1.00 0.13 4952.64 339.98  1.00 0.07 1632.85 33.87 
YF 0.99 0.09 4619.17 6.51  1.00 0.08 1667.18 68.20 
 Firefox  Chrome 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 1.00 0.03 2332.83 3.07  0.47 0.07 2773.10 0.00 
Weibull 1.00 0.03 2332.35 2.60  0.43 0.08 2822.16 49.05 
AML 0.00 0.05 2606.51 276.76  0.23 0.09 2892.74 119.64 
Normal 0.00 0.05 2605.51 275.76  0.20 0.09 2891.74 118.64 
Power-law 1.00 0.03 2329.75 0.00  0.24 0.10 2905.96 132.86 
RE 0.05 0.04 2496.37 166.61  0.00 0.12 3025.95 252.85 
RQ 0.46 0.03 2370.79 41.04  0.34 0.09 2848.45 75.35 






Table 29: CURVE FITTING ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS (ST.2) 
 IE (5.x &6.x)  IE (9.x &10.x) 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 0.42 0.04 2403.89 0.00  0.00 0.03 714.25 81.52 
Weibull 0.82 0.04 2405.72 1.83  0.00 0.03 664.79 32.06 
AML 0.00 0.06 2581.77 177.88  0.28 0.02 633.73 1.00 
Normal 0.00 0.06 2580.77 176.88  0.26 0.02 632.73 0.00 
Power-law 0.00 0.06 2648.43 244.54  0.00 0.11 913.15 280.42 
RE 0.00 0.08 2752.95 349.06  0.00 0.13 946.00 313.27 
RQ 0.00 0.07 2734.52 330.63  0.00 0.12 933.75 301.02 
YF 0.00 0.05 2491.38 87.49  0.00 0.03 714.25 81.52 
 IE (10.x &11.x)  Firefox (0.x , 1.x, 2.x) 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 0.95 0.02 543.12 0.00  0.00 0.08 1710.73 7.76 
Weibull 0.65 0.03 551.15 8.04  0.00 0.08 1710.73 7.76 
AML 0.85 0.04 598.93 55.81  0.00 0.11 1802.55 99.58 
Normal 0.63 0.04 597.93 54.81  0.00 0.11 1801.55 98.58 
Power-law 0.00 0.12 769.67 226.56  0.00 0.08 1707.73 4.76 
RE 0.00 0.14 796.28 253.16  0.00 0.08 1707.57 4.60 
RQ 0.00 0.13 786.27 243.16  0.05 0.08 1706.58 3.60 
YF 0.76 0.03 574.28 31.17  0.11 0.08 1702.97 0.00 
 Chrome (0.x , 1.x, 2.x)  Chrome (3.x , 4.x) 
 p-val HH AIC Δi  p-val HH AIC Δi 
Gamma 0.00 0.04 1026.71 146.40  0.07 0.09 1273.70 0.00 
Weibull 0.32 0.02 908.83 28.52  0.05 0.09 1275.41 1.71 
AML 0.68 0.03 936.37 56.07  0.00 0.13 1357.99 84.29 
Normal 0.68 0.03 935.37 55.07  0.00 0.13 1356.99 83.29 
Power-law 0.00 0.22 1444.48 564.17  0.00 0.10 1292.40 18.70 
RE 0.00 0.24 1464.31 584.00  0.00 0.11 1322.00 48.30 
RQ 0.00 0.24 1462.09 581.78  0.04 0.10 1279.97 6.27 
YF 1.00 0.02 880.31 0.00  0.04 0.10 1282.88 9.18 
 
6.5.3 Summary of curve-fitting results 
Overall, in terms of curve fitting, considering the OSs (St. 1), the Normal VDM 
was selected in two cases out of four. The AML, Weibull, and Gamma-based VDM, 
the Power-law, and RQ models were equally best model in one case out of four, while 
the RE model was the best model in three cases out of four. When considering the OSs 
(St. 2), the AML and Normal-based VDMs, and the YF model each are being selected 
as the best model in one case out of four (St. 2). However, for other web browsers, the 
results associated with St. 1 and St. 2 differ. 
Considering the web browsers (St. 1), the Gamma-based VDM provided the 
best fit in three out of four cases, whereas the Weibull and Normal-based VDMs along 
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with the Power-law model were each the best model in one of the cases. However, 
considering the web browsers (St. 2), the Gamma-based VDM was selected as the best 
model in three out of six cases. The Weibull-based VDM was found the best model in 
two cases out of six.  
6.6 Prediction Results 
6.6.1 Operating systems 
Tables 30-31 present the values of AE, AB, and %ΔAE𝑖 for the cases we 
analyzed per strategy, respectively. AB can be positive (for overestimation) or negative 
(for underestimation), while AE is always positive. We used * to show the models with 
p<0.05 and didn’t calculate %ΔAE𝑖 for those models (note: we used “NA” as the 
%ΔAE𝑖 value of the models with p<0.05). In each case, the model that has the smallest 
value of AE and p>0.05 was selected as having the best prediction capability and is 
highlighted in green. In addition, the model/models with %ΔAE𝑖 < 2 were also 
selected as the best prediction models, which, show similar prediction capability 
compared to the best model (the model/models with %ΔAE𝑖 = 0). 
Comparing the grouping strategies in terms of prediction capabilities, only for 
Mac (St. 1) and Mac_OS_X (St. 2) and Linux (St. 1) and Linux_Kernel (St. 2), was 
there one common best model. In other words, the Gamma-based VDM and the Power-
law model were the best models for IOS, Linux in both strategies, respectively. 





Table 30: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS (ST.1) 
 Windows  Mac 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.13 0.12 0.167 7.59  0.15 -0.14 0.280 0.00 
Weibull 0.13 0.12 0.169 7.72  0.25 -0.25 0.435 10.40 
AML 0.05 -0.05 0.103 0.00  0.27 -0.27 0.459 12.57 
Normal 0.05 -0.05 0.103 0.00  0.27 -0.27 0.459 12.57 
Power-law 0.13 0.12 0.171 7.85  0.36 0.36 0.322 21.40 
RE 0.45 0.45 0.531 39.98  0.87 0.87 0.737 72.64 
RQ 0.07 0.05 0.094 2.07  0.20 0.20 0.181 5.29 
YF 0.08 0.08 0.100 3.01  0.24 -0.24 0.420 9.64 
 IOS  Linux 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.17 -0.17 0.228 4.13  0.31 -0.31 0.594 18.33 
Weibull 0.17 -0.17 0.225 3.91  0.38 -0.38 0.733 25.17 
AML 0.25 -0.25 0.390 12.69  0.41 -0.41 0.785 28.00 
Normal 0.25 -0.25 0.390 12.69  0.41 -0.41 0.785 28.00 
Power-law 0.16 -0.16 0.224 3.87  0.14 -0.08 0.245 1.77 
RE 0.20* 0.20 0.226 NA  0.13 0.09 0.107 0.00 
RQ 0.27* -0.27 0.388 NA  0.14* -0.04 0.206 NA 
YF 0.13 -0.12 0.179 0.00  0.40 -0.40 0.771 27.10 
 
Table 31: PREDICTION  ACCURACY FOR OSS (ST.2) 
 Windows (Vista & 7)  Mac_OS_X 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.14 -0.12 0.252 5.83  0.24 -0.24 0.443 0.40 
Weibull 0.17 -0.16 0.313 8.86  0.31 -0.31 0.549 7.56 
AML 0.24 -0.24 0.421 15.91  0.32 -0.32 0.559 8.54 
Normal 0.24 -0.24 0.421 15.91  0.32 -0.32 0.559 8.54 
Power-law 0.08 0.05 0.080 0.00  0.23 0.23 0.197 0.00 
RE 0.15 0.15 0.131 6.50  0.55 0.55 0.440 31.42 
RQ 0.11 0.10 0.097 2.50  0.23 0.23 0.198 0.04 
YF 0.23 -0.23 0.404 14.37  0.31 -0.31 0.552 7.82 
 IOS (11.x & 12.x)  Linux_Kernel 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.08 0.04 0.099 0.41  0.31 -0.31 0.552 26.96 
Weibull 0.08 0.04 0.099 0.45  0.38 -0.38 0.705 33.67 
AML 0.07 -0.07 0.084 0.00  0.40 -0.40 0.730 35.28 
Normal 0.07 -0.07 0.084 0.00  0.40 -0.40 0.730 35.28 
Power-law 0.08 0.04 0.100 0.46  0.04 0.02 0.053 0.00 
RE 0.29* 0.29 0.359 NA  0.33 0.33 0.369 28.72 
RQ 0.10 0.07 0.129 2.38  0.06* -0.06 0.118 NA 
YF 0.13 0.12 0.172 5.91  0.37 -0.37 0.685 32.90 
6.6.2 Web browsers 
Tables 32-33 present the values of AE, AB, and %ΔAE𝑖 for the four web 





Table 32: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS (ST.1) 
 IE  Safari 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.20 -0.16 0.364 7.90  0.16 0.16 0.140 5.42 
Weibull 0.22 -0.19 0.423 10.17  0.10 0.01 0.131 0.00 
AML 0.33 -0.33 0.673 21.31  0.15 -0.14 0.271 4.94 
Normal 0.33 -0.33 0.673 21.31  0.15 -0.14 0.271 4.94 
Power-law 0.17 -0.09 0.266 4.92  0.43 0.43 0.388 32.61 
RE 0.12 0.06 0.104 0.00  1.02 1.02 0.870 91.95 
RQ 0.15 -0.05 0.221 3.78  0.29 0.29 0.266 18.74 
YF 0.29 -0.29 0.610 17.77  0.12 -0.05 0.187 1.34 
 Firefox  Chrome 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.05 -0.05 0.049 2.21  0.21 -0.21 0.360 0.00 
Weibull 0.05 -0.04 0.049 2.17  0.31 -0.31 0.508 10.13 
AML 0.18* -0.18 0.236 NA  0.27 -0.27 0.446 6.22 
Normal 0.18* -0.18 0.236 NA  0.27 -0.27 0.446 6.22 
Power-law 0.05 -0.04 0.048 2.13  1.00 1.00 0.833 79.27 
RE 0.06 0.06 0.086 3.94  2.14* 2.14 1.537 NA 
RQ 0.02 0.00 0.031 0.00  0.40 0.40 0.374 19.41 
YF 0.07 -0.07 0.079 4.13  0.26 -0.26 0.435 5.12 
Table 33: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS (ST.2) 
 IE (5.x &6.x)  IE (9.x &10.x) 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.06 0.06 0.065 2.07  0.23* 0.23 0.268 NA 
Weibull 0.04 0.03 0.043 0.00  0.17* 0.17 0.192 NA 
AML 0.10* -0.10 0.138 NA  0.04 -0.04 0.054 1.80 
Normal 0.10* -0.10 0.138 NA  0.04 -0.04 0.054 1.80 
Power-law 0.17* 0.17 0.169 NA  0.33* 0.33 0.365 NA 
RE 0.27* 0.27 0.260 NA  0.68* 0.68 0.680 NA 
RQ 0.23* 0.23 0.218 NA  0.33* 0.33 0.363 NA 
YF 0.07* -0.07 0.110 NA  0.03 0.03 0.029 0.00 
 IE (10.x &11.x)  Firefox (0.x , 1.x, 2.x) 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.06 0.06 0.067 0.85  0.14* -0.14 0.157 NA 
Weibull 0.05 -0.05 0.066 0.00  0.14* -0.14 0.157 NA 
AML 0.12 -0.12 0.149 6.88  0.24* -0.24 0.280 NA 
Normal 0.12 -0.12 0.149 6.88  0.24* -0.24 0.280 NA 
Power-law 0.43* 0.43 0.442 NA  0.14* -0.13 0.148 NA 
RE 0.86* 0.86 0.811 NA  0.11* -0.10 0.119 NA 
RQ 0.41* 0.41 0.424 NA  0.14 -0.14 0.160 2.21 
YF 0.09 -0.09 0.114 3.79  0.12 -0.11 0.134 0.00 
 Chrome (0.x , 1.x, 2.x)  Chrome (3.x , 4.x) 
 AE AB HH %ΔAEi  AE AB HH %ΔAEi 
Gamma 0.12* 0.12 0.175 NA  0.25 -0.25 0.305 0.00 
Weibull 0.04 0.04 0.063 2.10  0.27 -0.27 0.329 2.51 
AML 0.02 -0.02 0.026 0.17  0.27* -0.27 0.334 NA 
Normal 0.02 -0.02 0.026 0.17  0.27* -0.27 0.334 NA 
Power-law 0.52* 0.52 0.779 NA  0.04* -0.02 0.052 NA 
RE 1.19* 1.19 1.778 NA  0.04* 0.04 0.074 NA 
RQ 0.55* 0.55 0.816 NA  0.12* -0.12 0.135 NA 




6.6.3 Summary of prediction results 
Overall, in terms of prediction, considering the OSs (St. 1), all the models 
except the Weibull-based VDM were selected as the best model in one case out of four. 
Considering the OSs (St. 2), the Power-law model was the best one in all four cases. 
The Gamma-based VDM was the most accurate in two cases; the other models except 
the RE model each were selected as the best model in one case.   
Considering the web browsers (St. 1), the Gamma and Weibull-based VDMs 
and the RE, YF, and RQ models were each better than other models in one case out of 
four. However, considering the web browsers (St. 2), the YF model was most accurate 
in three cases out of six. Gamma, Weibull, AML, and Normal-based VDMs are the 
best models in two cases.  
Please remember that all the conclusions we draw from this research and their 
validity are limited by our database uncertainties. 
6.7 Discussion 
In this section, we take a closer look at our findings and then offer some 
guidelines to model vulnerability discovery data with respect to the shape of the 
discovery intensity functions. 
Tables 34-35 show the summary of the selected models per dataset for curve-
fitting and prediction, respectively. For curve-fitting, the models p-value<0.05 are 
highlighted in red.  Based upon the results, in terms of curve fitting, out of eight datasets 
grouped by Strategy #1 (St. 1), the Gamma-based, Normal-based, Weibull-based, 
Power-law, AML and RQ VDMs provided the best (or equally best) fit in four, three, 
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two, two, one, one, cases, respectively. The other models were most accurate in neither 
of the cases.  
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In terms of curve fitting, out of ten datasets in St.2, the YF, Gamma-based, and 
RE VDMs were most accurate in four, three, and three cases, respectively. The AML, 
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Normal-based, and RQ VDMs each were most accurate in one case. The other models 
were most accurate in neither of the cases.  
In terms of prediction accuracy, out of eight datasets in St.1, the Gamma-based, 
RE, and YF VDMs, each provided the best (or equally best) fit in two cases. The other 
models each were most accurate in one case.  
In terms of prediction accuracy, out of ten datasets in St.2, the Gamma-based, 
Power-law, Weibull-based, AML, Normal-based, and YF VDMs were most accurate 
in four, four, three, three, and three cases, respectively. The RQ model was most 
accurate in one case.  
Based upon our findings we found similar guideline per grouping strategy, in 
terms of cure-fitting (the Gamma-based VDM). However, we found different 
guidelines, in terms of prediction accuracy. In some cases, we found that the selected 
model/models for a software from St. 1 is/are similar to those selected for its 
subversions from St. 2. However, it just occurred in few cases. For IOS (curve-fitting), 
AML and Normal-based VDMs were the best models in both strategies. For Chrome 
(curve-fitting) and one of its subversions (Chrome 3.x & 4.x), the Gamma-based VDM 
was the best common model considering both strategies. For Mac (prediction), the 
Gamma-based VDM was the most accurate model in both strategies. For Linux 
(prediction), the Power-law model was the best model in both strategies. 
6.8 Limitations 
There are several limitations to our work that prevent us from making more 
general conclusions. Part of the limitations we are facing with are common with 
previous chapters like the uncertainties associated with vulnerability databases and the 
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way we collect the vulnerability data reported for any version of a software from 
different sources and filtering them based upon the earliest date that a given 
vulnerability was known in any of these sources (cf. Section 4.7).   
In addition, we have only applied the approach to 8 software and their subsets. 
We don’t know yet how well this works for other software and vulnerability datasets 
associated with them (cf. Section 5.9).  
The next limitation is that we assumed the percentage of common 
vulnerabilities for two or more consecutive versions of a software would be a good 
measure regarding the similarity of their source code (i.e., we grouped the consecutive 
versions with more than 70% common reported vulnerabilities). There other factors 
which could be considered together with our assumption to improve its validity. For 
example, looking at the source code of those versions and finding the number of lines 
with similar code. However, collecting such features is only feasible for open-source 
software and can’t be applied on private software. 
6.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we developed some guidelines for analyzing vulnerabilities (i.e., 
those datasets where more vulnerabilities are reported earlier in the product lifecycle) 
using two vulnerability grouping strategies. We compared the curve fitting and 
prediction capabilities of eight different models: one NHPP Power-law model, two 
right-skewed distribution models, one flexible-skewed distribution model, three 
symmetric distribution models, and two non S-shaped VDMs. These models were 
applied on eighteen datasets that originated from four OSs and four web browsers. The 
datasets were built using two strategies for grouping vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities 
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merged for all versions and groups built based on a number of common vulnerabilities 
across versions). We found that a model’s ability to provide a good fit does not 
necessarily guarantee superior prediction capabilities from the same model.  
88 
 
Chapter 7: Vulnerability Prediction Capability: A 
Comparison between Vulnerability Discovery Models and 
Neural Network Models 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we introduce an approach for predicting the total number of 
software vulnerabilities and compare the results with those found from aforementioned 
VDMs. Our approach uses a neural network model (NNM) to model the nonlinearities 
associated with vulnerability disclosure. Eight common VDMs were used to compare 
their prediction capability with NNM.  
7.2 Motivation 
Vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) were developed to predict future 
software vulnerabilities based on their historical behavior. Although VDMs are often 
accurate in terms of curve fitting, they might not perform well in prediction phase [25]. 
Indeed, VDMs are often not powerful enough to take the nonlinear nature of 
vulnerability disclosure times into consideration. In recent years, some software 
vulnerability disclosure process models were developed using traditional time series 
models like Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARIMA) [67]. However, vulnerability 
disclosure data contain a lot of nonlinearity and thus traditional time series models 
might not be appropriate [68]. Pokhrel et al. [69] compared the modeling capability of 
linear and nonlinear time series for three OSs (i.e. Windows 7, Mac OS X, and Linux 
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Kernel). They developed models based on ARIMA, Artificial Neural Network (ANN), 
and Support Vector Machine (SVM) settings. 
In this chapter, we make the following contributions: 
- We introduce a nonlinear modeling approach based on neural networks to 
model the nonlinearities associated with vulnerability disclosure times and predict the 
total number of software vulnerabilities in 30-day time intervals.  
- We compare the prediction capability of the neural network model (NNM) 
with eight commonly used VDMs. We applied the models to vulnerability data 
associated with our aforementioned database consist of four well known operating 
systems (OSs) (Windows, Mac, IOS (the OS associated with Cisco), and Linux), as 
well as four well-known web browsers (Internet Explorer, Safari, Firefox, and 
Chrome). 
- We show that the NNM outperforms the VDMs in all the cases in terms of 
prediction accuracy, and provides smaller values of absolute average bias in seven 
cases. 
7.3 Data Processing 
We will analyze the reported vulnerabilities associated with four well-known 
OSs: Windows (1995-2017), Mac (1997-2017), IOS (the OS associated with Cisco) 
(1992-2017), and Linux (1994-2017), as well as four well-known web browsers: 
Internet Explorer (1997-2017), Safari (2003-2017), Firefox (2003-2017), and Chrome 
(2008-2017). These software have been selected because they are the most widely used 
and have the most vulnerabilities in the database. Figures 8 and 9 show the detection 
frequency of all vulnerabilities associated with each software over time intervals of 30 
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days for the studied OSs and web browsers, respectively. We also plotted the 180-days 
moving average (MOVAVG) for each software to gain a better understanding of 
vulnerability detection trend. As is shown, the maximum value of MOVAVG for all 
cases occurred after 2015.   
As mentioned in Chapter 3, for each software, we analyze all vulnerabilities 
reported for any of its versions. Thus, for each software, all the vulnerabilities reported 
for any of its versions were included. In addition, regarding our analysis, we divided 
the vulnerability dataset associated with each software into two groups: training and 
testing. The training data set consists of all the vulnerabilities reported before 2015. 
The testing data set consists of vulnerabilities reported in years 2015, 2016, and 2017. 
Table 36 represents the total number of vulnerabilities per software, as well as the 
number of vulnerabilities in the training and testing phases. 
 
Table 36: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER SOFTWARE  
OS  Windows Mac IOS Linux 
Total 3100 2705 650 4745 
Train 2237 1605 438 2609 
Test 863 1100 212 2136 
Web Browser  IE Safari Firefox Chrome 
Total 1775 943 1477 1837 
Train 1059 701 1150 1229 







 Histogram of the number of detected vulnerabilities per 30 days together with its 180-days moving 
average for the studied OSs. The X-axis represents time (Year). The Y-axis shows the frequency of 
discovered vulnerabilities over 30 days time intervals. The blue and red colors show data associated with the 




 Histogram of the number of detected vulnerabilities per 30 days together with its 180-days moving 
average for the studied Web browsers. The X-axis represents time (Year). The Y-axis shows the frequency of 
discovered vulnerabilities over 30 days time intervals. The blue and red colors show data associated with the 




7.4 Neural Network Model (NNM) 
Neural network models (NNMs) consist of a set of algorithms for modeling and 
recognizing patterns. NNMs have been widely used for predicting data with sequential 
time series data such as monthly electricity demand of a city or stock price [68], [70], 
[71]. Unlike VDMs, NNMs are capable of integrating the nonlinearity that exist in 
noisy time series data. In addition, NNMs are not built upon assumptions regarding the 
form of the basic model since they are completely data driven models. In other words, 
NNMs are flexible nonlinear data driven models with powerful prediction power. Data 
driven models are useful for the cases where there is not a theoretical guidance to 
explain the data generation process. It has been empirically shown that NNMs are 
capable of predicting both linear and nonlinear time series of different forms [72]. 
To predict the number of discovered vulnerabilities getting over time for a given 
software, we use a feedforward NNM, which is the most widely used neural network 
[68]. Feedforward NNMs accept a fixed number of inputs at a time and generate one 
output. We assume that the number of future vulnerabilities depend on the number of 
vulnerabilities disclosed over the past periods (lags).  
We use a single hidden-layer NNM for one step-ahead prediction. According 
to [73], a single hidden layer NNM is capable of approximating any non-linear function 
with arbitrary precision. Figure 10 shows the structure of the NNM used in our study. 
Our feedforward NNM consists of three layers called input, hidden, and output. Each 
layer is a collection of neurons (nodes) where the connections are governed by the 
corresponding weights. Data have been fed through the input layer, and then they pass 
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 The NNM Architecture Used for Our Study  
 
To predict the present value, several past observations are used. In other words, 
the inputs are a p-element subset of the set {𝑦𝑡−𝑝, . . . , 𝑦𝑡−2, 𝑦𝑡−1}; and 𝑦𝑡 is the output 
or the total number of vulnerabilities reported in period t. Equations 25 and 26 show 
the formulas associated with the input and output values of the hidden layer, 
respectively. For the output layer, the input and output values are represented by 
equations 27 and 28, respectively. 
𝐼𝑗 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑖 × 𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑡−𝑝
   (𝑗 = 1, … , ℎ),                                      (25) 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑓ℎ(𝐼𝑗)                           (𝑗 = 1, … , ℎ),                                       (26) 
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𝐼𝑜 = ∑ 𝑤𝑜𝑗 × 𝑦𝑗 + 𝛼𝑜
ℎ
𝑗=1
     (𝑜 = 1),                                               (27) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓𝑜(𝐼𝑜)                            (𝑜 = 1),                                               (28) 
 
where I denotes the input; y denotes the output; p and h are the number of input and 
hidden layer nodes, respectively; 𝑤𝑗𝑖 represents the connection weights of the input and 
hidden layers; and 𝑤𝑜𝑗 denotes the connection weights of the hidden and output layers. 
The bias values of the hidden and output layers are respectively shown by 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛼𝑜, 
and are always between -1 and 1. 𝑓ℎ and 𝑓𝑜 are the non-linear activation functions 
associated with the hidden and the output layers, respectively. As the hidden layer 
activation function, we used a hyperbolic tangent function since it is the function that 
most widely used [68].  
The initial step in designing a NNM is to determine the optimal number of input nodes 
(lags) and hidden layer nodes. Based on the literature, there is no systematic approach 
[68]; the most common way of identifying the appropriate number of the nodes (input 
and hidden) is via trial and error based upon finding the minimum mean square error 
(MSE) of the test data [74]. We followed this approach and identified the number of 
hidden nodes experimentally for the time series associated with each software. We 
evaluated up to 50 hidden nodes for each time series and chose the number of hidden 
nodes that minimized the MSE. Regarding the optimal number of inputs (lags), we used 
an optimization algorithm and chose the best combination of lags that led to the lowest 
MSE. We started with statistically significant lags derived from the process of 
evaluating the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) associated with each time series. 
95 
 
In time series analysis, PACF gives the linear partial correlation of a time series with 
its own lagged values and evaluated [75]. However, we cannot only rely on the lags we 
found from the PACF since, in such case, the selection of inputs would be merely based 
on the identification of a linear model, while the goal for using NNM is to capture non-
linear correlations, as well. A very good review of existing input selection methods for 
NNMs is provided in [76]. 
The NNM developed was programmed using Matlab R2018a. For each 
software, we began our analysis by dividing the vulnerability dataset into two groups; 
training and testing. The training dataset consists of all the vulnerabilities reported 
before 2015. The testing data set consists of vulnerabilities reported in years 2015, 
2016, and 2017. NNM training is a complex nonlinear optimization problem. Thus, 
there is the possibility to get trapped in local minima of the error surface. To avoid 
getting poor results, the training process should be repeated several times with different 
random starting weights and biases [72].  
We set the maximum training number equal to 500 epochs. Epoch stands for 
the total number of times a given dataset is utilized for training and shows the number 
of times the weights in a network were updated [77]. Since model optimization in deep 
learning algorithms is done using the gradient decent method [78], it makes sense to 
pass the learning dataset through the network multiple times accordingly to update the 
weights and achieve a more accurate model, in terms of prediction [77]. We used the 
Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) method as our learning function. The activation function 
of the hidden and output layers are the tansig and purelin functions, respectively. To 
avoid overfitting/over training, for each software, we employed a cross validation 
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method by dividing our training dataset into three subgroups of training data (70%), 
validation data (15%), and test data (15%); and checked the validation performance of 
the trained network via metrics provided by Matlab Neural Network toolbox such as 
gradient decent (gradient threshold=1.00e-4) and maximum number of validation 
checks (max_fail=100). These metrics served as stop conditions of the training phase. 
Whenever the parameters of the network under training met any of these thresholds, 
the training process was stopped. This process avoids the algorithm to be over-trained 
and produce overfitted results.  
7.5 Analysis 
We used the eight VDMs introduced in Chapter 3 and one NNM for the 
discovery process of vulnerabilities in four OSs and four web browsers. The VDMs 
were fitted to the datasets using a non-linear regression method described in [24].   
The analysis of the prediction capability started by dividing the data into two 
groups of training and testing data. Both the VDMs and the NNM use a dataset that 
includes all vulnerabilities reported for all versions of a given software. The training 
period starts from the time when the first vulnerability associated with a given software 
was discovered and continues until 12/31/2014. We calculated the predictions for the 
years 2015, 2016, and 2017. As it is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9, the blue and the 
red show the data associated with training and testing datasets, respectively. We split 
the vulnerability data into intervals of 30 days as is common in the vulnerability 
analysis literature [18], [24], [25]. 
For the VDMs, during the training period, the training data was used to estimate 
model parameters. The estimated final values for each 30-day interval produced by the 
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eight models were compared with the actual number of vulnerabilities to calculate the 
prediction accuracy. For the NNM, for each software, we used the training data to train 
the NNM. Using the trained NNM, we predicted the expected values for the next steps. 
The prediction accuracy is based on the comparison between the obtained estimation 
and the actual number of vulnerabilities.  
For the training part, for VDMs, we applied the Chi-square (χ2) goodness of fit 
test to assess how well each model fits the training datasets. For the training part, for 
the NNM, out of the models trained with different number of lags, the optimal 
analytical model was selected based on the MSE value. Finally, for each software, the 
best selected analytical model was used to make the prediction for the testing data set 
(the vulnerabilities reported in 2015, 2016, and 2017). In this chapter, regarding the 
NNMs, we just reported the results associated with the best NNM.  
For the prediction part, we calculated the two normalized predictability 
measures, AE, AB. These indicator and their associated equations were introduced in 
Chapters 4 and 6.  In addition, for the VDMs, we report ΔAE𝑖, which represents the 
percentage of difference between the AE of the i-the model and the model with 
minimum AE. 
7.6 Results 
Tables 37- 38 present the values of AE, AB, ΔAE𝑖, and p-value (we used * to 
show the models with p<0.05) for the cases we analyzed per model (VDMs and NNM), 
respectively. AB can be positive (for overestimation) or negative (for underestimation), 
while AE is always positive. In each case, we first found the best VDMs by comparing 
their prediction accuracy and then compared the accuracy of those models with the 
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NNM. In other words, for the VDMs, the model that has the smallest value of AE was 
selected as having the best prediction capability and is highlighted in yellow. In 
addition, the VDMs with ΔAE𝑖 < 2 were also selected as the best VDMs, which, show 
similar prediction capability compared to the best model (the model/models with 
ΔAE𝑖 = 0). In addition, the normalized error values ((Ω𝑡 − Ω)/Ω) associated with the 
OSs and web browsers are plotted in Figure 11 and Figure 12, respectively. As it is 
shown, the models with less fluctuations lead to higher accuracy.  
 
Table 37: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR OSS (VDMS & NNM) 
 Windows  Mac 
 AE AB %ΔAEi p-value  AE AB %ΔAEi p-value 
Gamma 0.028 0.002 0.000 0.805  0.247 -0.247 20.537 0.817 
Weibull 0.036 -0.031 0.776 0.870  0.281 -0.281 24.006 0.437 
AML 0.087 -0.087 5.844 0.016*  0.287 -0.287 24.601 0.809 
Normal 0.087 -0.087 5.844 0.016*  0.287 -0.287 24.601 0.809 
Power-law 0.078 0.078 4.982 0.435  0.062 -0.045 2.066 0.030 
RE 0.172 0.172 14.365 0.027*  0.041 0.041 0.000 0.402 
RQ 0.075 0.075 4.718 0.579  0.066 -0.049 2.452 0.001* 
YF 0.059 -0.057 3.067 0.178  0.279 -0.279 23.751 0.751 
NNM 0.015 -0.011 NA NA  0.018 0.010 NA NA 
 IOS  Linux 
 AE AB %ΔAEi p-value  AE AB %ΔAEi p-value 
Gamma 0.076 -0.076 4.778 0.901  0.277 -0.277 9.302 0.828 
Weibull 0.071 -0.071 4.195 0.902  0.272 -0.272 8.791 0.611 
AML 0.045 -0.045 1.646 0.890  0.336 -0.336 15.146 0.000* 
Normal 0.045 -0.045 1.646 0.890  0.336 -0.336 15.146 0.000* 
Power-law 0.070 -0.070 4.173 0.002*  0.246 -0.246 6.204 0.342 
RE 0.059 0.045 3.027 0.001*  0.184 -0.184 0.000 0.705 
RQ 0.199 -0.199 16.988 0.000*  0.238 -0.238 5.341 0.342 
YF 0.029 -0.018 0.000 0.930  0.307 -0.307 12.229 0.569 










 Prediction errors for OSs. The X-axis indicates time (Year). The Y-axis represents normalized 




Table 38: PREDICTION  ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS (VDMS & NNM) 
 IE  Safari 
 AE AB %ΔAEi p-value  AE AB %ΔAEi p-value 
Gamma 0.264 -0.264 5.887 0.891  0.165 -0.165 9.391 0.049 
Weibull 0.264 -0.264 5.841 0.891  0.216 -0.216 14.474 0.330 
AML 0.319 -0.319 11.357 0.009*  0.225 -0.225 15.371 0.330 
Normal 0.319 -0.319 11.357 0.009*  0.225 -0.225 15.371 0.330 
Power-law 0.264 -0.264 5.820 0.891  0.072 0.072 0.000 0.409 
RE 0.206 -0.206 0.000 0.309  0.190 0.190 11.801 0.017* 
RQ 0.249 -0.249 4.324 0.590  0.081 0.081 0.976 0.693 
YF 0.268 -0.268 6.287 0.309  0.215 -0.215 14.336 0.978 
NNM 0.028 0.006 NA NA  0.042 -0.037 NA NA 
 Firefox  Chrome 
 AE AB %ΔAEi p-value  AE AB %ΔAEi p-value 
Gamma 0.036 0.032 0.123 0.263  0.248 -0.248 0.000 0.890 
Weibull 0.036 0.032 0.099 0.263  0.292 -0.292 4.379 0.897 
AML 0.088 -0.088 5.304 0.008*  0.270 -0.270 2.174 0.805 
Normal 0.088 -0.088 5.304 0.008*  0.270 -0.270 2.174 0.805 
Power-law 0.056 0.056 2.089 0.263  0.336 0.336 8.802 0.000* 
RE 0.160 0.160 12.452 0.091  0.623 0.623 37.481 0.000* 
RQ 0.084 0.084 4.927 0.159  0.120 0.120 NA 0.000* 
YF 0.035 -0.034 0.000 0.121  0.269 -0.269 2.146 0.950 







 Prediction errors for web browsers. The X-axis indicates time (Year). The Y-axis represents 




Based on the results provided by Tables 37-38, in terms of prediction accuracy 
(AE), the NNM led to most accurate results in all of the eight software we analyzed. 
To be more precise, for Windows, the NNM’s average error (AE) is 1.3%, and 2.1% 
smaller than the AEs associated with the best VDMs, which were Gamma and Weibull-
based VDMs. For Mac, this difference is 2.3%. For IOS, the NNM outperforms the 
best VDMs (YF, AML and Normal) by having 0.8%, 2.4%, and 2.4% smaller average 
errors, respectively. Linux and IE are two of the cases where the NNM provides far 
better predictions than those from VDMs by being 14.4%, and 17.8% more accurate. 
The average error of the NNM for Safari is 3% and 3.9% smaller than those from the 
best VDMs (Power-law and RQ). 
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For Firefox, the NNM improved the predictions by 0.5%, 0.6%, and 0.6% 
compared to YF, Gamma, and Weibull-based VDMs, respectively. For Chrome, the 
VDM with smallest is not statistically sound from the training part. So, we opt for the 
next VDM with p-value>0.05 and smallest AE, which is Gamma. In this case, the NNM 
accuracy improvement is 20.5%. Overall, the highest differences in prediction accuracy 
between the NNM and the VDMs were found in Chrome (20.5%), IE (17.8%), Linux 
(14.4%), and Safari (3.9%), respectively. 
In terms of magnitude of error, out of eight software we analyzed, the NNM 
outperformed the VDMs in seven cases by having smaller |AB| values. Only for 
Windows, the absolute value of bias provided by one of the selected VDMs was 0.9% 
smaller than the one resulted from the NNM. For Mac, IOS, Linux, IE, Safari, Firefox, 
and Chrome, the bias magnitudes provided by the NNM were smaller than those from 
the best VDMs (in each case, we considered the best VDM, which had smallest |AB|) 
by 3.1%, 0.4%, 15%, 20%, 3.5%, 1.6%, and 23.9%, respectively.  
Overall, in terms of accuracy, out of the eight cases we analyzed, the NNM 
outperformed VDMs in all the cases. Besides, in terms of magnitude of bias, the NNM 
led to smallest bias values in seven cases. 
Please remember that all the conclusions we draw from this research and their 
validity are limited by our database uncertainties. 
7.7 Discussion 
In terms of prediction accuracy (AE), considering the OSs and web browsers, 
the NNM led to more accurate results than the best selected VDMs in all the cases. The 
Gamma-based VDM was selected as the best model in three cases out of four. The 
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Weibull and YF VDMs were each best compared with other models in one case out of 
four. 
In terms of overall magnitude of bias (i.e., absolute value of AB), out of the 
eight cases we analyzed, the NNM provided smaller absolute values of bias in seven 
cases compared to the best VDMs. Only for Windows, the absolute value of bias 
provided by the Gamma-based VDM (0.002) was smaller than the one resulted from 
NN (-0.011). 
We believe that the final decision, in equal accuracy conditions, in terms of 
bias, is up to the researcher to choose the best model based upon his/her priorities. 
However, from a security point of view, it is better to choose a model, which provides 
more conservative prediction results. In the current study, among the models that were 
selected as the best predictors, only two NNMs (Mac and IE) provided overestimated 
results. Other selected NNMs underestimated the number of vulnerabilities. It can also 
be easily inferred from Figure 11 and Figure 12, where for Mac and IE most of the 
prediction points associated with the NNMs are located over the X=0 axis.  
We believe that the NNM’s better performance compared to VDMs comes from 
the capability of the NNM in predicting the nonlinearity nature of the vulnerability 
disclosure time series. In addition, most VDMs consider the vulnerability discovery 
process as a pure S-shaped curve or a function with a monotonic intensity function with 
constant total number of vulnerabilities. However, the number of vulnerabilities 
associated with a given software may change as newer versions are released. 
Additionally, VDMs and traditional time-series functions only use one set of 
parameters for estimation. On the other hand, NNMs due to having multilayer 
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perceptron structure, having multiple neurons per layer, and using different set of 
parameters per neuron provide a more complicated structure for prediction. Of course, 
the specific validation method we used to avoid being trapped by overfitting in the 
learning phase is another advantage of using NNMs. 
7.8 Limitations 
There are a few limitations to our work that prevents us from expanding our 
conclusions in a more generalized manner. Some of them are common with previous 
chapters of this dissertation such as uncertainties associated with vulnerability data 
public repositories (cf. Section 4.7). 
Another common limitation is with respect to utilizing announced published 
date of vulnerabilities as their discovery date. Vulnerabilities normally get identified 
before by pernicious users than the time they are officially reported. To ensure that this 
gauge is as close as conceivable to the real date the vulnerability is publicly known to 
the world, we searched for various vulnerability repositories and selected the earliest 
date announced for a vulnerability (cf. Section 4.7).  
Another limitation is as to the manner in which we combined all vulnerabilities 
announced for all versions of a given software to have sufficient data for training the 
models (cf. Section 5.9). While number of studies utilize vulnerability data associated 
with separate version of software (e.g. Windows 7) on which to apply VDMs, there are 
papers that consider all versions of a software together [25], [62]. The first group 
expects that each version of a given software is an independent and all around 
characterized item, yet distinguishing the sources of reliance in vulnerability data is not 
a simple task. 
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The next limitation is that we only used one machine learning algorithm (Neural 
Network) to show the better performance of such algorithms over the commonly used 
VDMs. There are several other algorithms like SVMs, which could also be used. 
However, since our research question was not associated with comparing the prediction 
performance of other machine learning algorithms, we only chose one of them.    
7.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we compared the capabilities of eight common vulnerability 
discovery models (VDMs) with a nonlinear neural network model (NNM) in terms of 
predicting the total number of future vulnerabilities over a prediction period of three 
years. We applied the mentioned models to vulnerability data associated with four well 
known OSs and four well-known web browsers. The models were assessed in terms of 
prediction accuracy and prediction bias. The results showed that the NNM 
outperformed the VDMs in all the cases in terms of prediction accuracy. In terms of 
overall magnitude of bias, out of the eight cases we analyzed, the NNM provided the 
smallest absolute values of bias in seven cases compared to the best VDMs. This 
chapter shows that neural networks are promising for accurate predictions of the total 





Chapter 8: Predicting Exploited Vulnerabilities  
8.1 Introduction 
Exploited vulnerabilities typically form 2-7% of all the vulnerabilities reported 
for a given software. With a smaller number of known exploited vulnerabilities 
compared with the total number of vulnerabilities, it is more difficult to mathematically 
model and predict when a vulnerability with a known exploit will be reported. In this 
chapter, we introduce an approach for predicting the total number of publicly-known 
exploited vulnerabilities using all publicly-known vulnerabilities reported for a given 
software. Eight commonly used VDMs and one NNM were utilized to evaluate the 
prediction capability of our approach. We compared their predictions results with the 
scenario when only exploited vulnerabilities were used for prediction. 
8.2 Motivation 
For some vulnerabilities, exploits are never published. This might be because 
the patches for these vulnerabilities are made available very quickly by the vendors, 
and hence it is not profitable for the crackers to develop exploits for them; the 
vulnerabilities have a lower criticality from the security viewpoint; or it might be that 
that exploits for these vulnerabilities are only known to the vendors, to security 
agencies or are exchanged in, for example, darkweb forums. Whatever the explanation 
may be, vulnerabilities with publicly-known exploits usually form only 2-7% of all the 
vulnerabilities reported for an specific version of given software [47], [79]. In addition, 
as opposed to vulnerability databases such as NVD, which are actively maintained, 
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security repositories reporting exploited vulnerabilities like Exploit Database, also 
known as “ExploitDB”, are less common. A comparison between NVD and ExploitDB 
finds that only 22% of NVD distinct vulnerabilities have exploits reported and listed in 
ExploitDB. On the other hand, vulnerabilities with known exploits are more dangerous 
to end users, even if patches may be available, since not all users regularly patch their 
systems. For this reason, it is important for both vendors and users to be able to predict 
the time to the next vulnerability with a known exploit. However, with a smaller 
number of known exploited vulnerabilities compared with the total number of 
vulnerabilities, it is difficult to model and predict when a vulnerability with a known 
exploit will be reported. Specifically, the data scarcity makes it difficult to use data 
driven models, which are helpful where there is no theoretical guidance to explain the 
data generation process, for such data [80]. Therefore, we postulate that it is a 
worthwhile research activity to explore whether there is a link between disclosure times 
of all vulnerabilities reported for a given software and discovery times of its exploited 
vulnerabilities. Finding such link would allow to use a larger dataset of all 
vulnerabilities for predicting the time when vulnerabilities with exploits will be 
reported. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no research focusing on modeling 
exploited vulnerabilities. The only efforts in this area is probabilistic examination of 
intrusions by [52], [53]. Lack of data is a big barrier on the way to modeling exploited 
vulnerabilities using current VDMs or the machine learning techniques, which require 
considerable amount of data for satisfactory training.  
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In this chapter, we introduce an approach for predicting the total number of 
publicly-known exploited vulnerabilities using all vulnerabilities reported for a given 
software. Eight commonly used VDMs as well as one NNM were used to evaluate the 
prediction capability of our approach. We applied the models to vulnerability data 
associated with four well-known OSs (Windows, Mac, IOS (the OS associated with 
Cisco), and Linux), as well as four well-known web browsers (Internet Explorer, Safari, 
Firefox, and Chrome). 
Our work makes the following contributions: 
- We introduce an approach for predicting total number of publicly-known 
exploited vulnerabilities using all vulnerabilities reported for a given 
software; 
- We compare the prediction capability of two scenarios S1 and S2, S1 when 
all the vulnerabilities are considered, S2 when only exploited vulnerabilities 
are, utilizing eight VDMs and one NNM on eight well-known software; 
- We show that, out of eight software we analyzed, scenario S1 outperforms 
scenario S2 in seven cases in terms of prediction accuracy. Only in one case, 
the prediction of S1 was worse than S2 by 1.5%. In other words, for most 
of the cases analyzed, we show that using all the vulnerability data available 
for a system allows to better predict when vulnerabilities that will have 
publicly-known exploits for them will be reported 
8.3 Data Processing 
We will analyze the reported vulnerabilities associated with four well-known 
OSs: Windows (1995-2017), Mac (1997-2017), IOS (the OS associated with Cisco) 
108 
 
(1992-2017), and Linux (1994-2017), as well as four well-known web browsers: 
Internet Explorer (1997-2017), Safari (2003-2017), Firefox (2003-2017), and Chrome 
(2008-2017). These software have been selected because they are the most widely used 
and have the most vulnerabilities in the database.  
For each software, all the vulnerabilities reported for any of its versions were 
included. For instance, all the vulnerabilities reported for mac_os, mac_os_server, 
mac_os_x, and mac_os_x_server were put together to create a vulnerability database 
for Mac. 
Two scenarios were considered. In the first scenario (S1), we analyze all 
vulnerabilities reported for a software for any of its versions. In the second scenario 
(S2), for each software, we only consider the exploited vulnerabilities. 
Table 39 presents the total number of vulnerabilities for each software (All 
vulnerabilities together (”S1”) and only exploited vulnerabilities (“S2”)). The 
percentages of exploited/unexploited vulnerabilities per software are presented in 
Figure 13. Windows and IE had the most percentages of exploited vulnerabilities with 
24.13% and 22.65%, respectively. 
Table 39: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER SOFTWARE (ALL VS. EXPLOITED) 
OS Windows Mac IOS Linux 
# All 
Vulnerabilities 
3100 2705 650 4745 
# Exploited 
Vulnerabilities 
748 282 27 481 
Web Browser  IE Safari Firefox Chrome 
# All 
Vulnerabilities 
1775 943 1477 1837 
# Exploited 
Vulnerabilities 






 Percentage of exploited vulnerabilities per software 
 
8.4 Analytical steps of scenario S1 
8.4.1 For the VDMs 
In this section, we explain the approach we developed to predict the number of 
publicly-reported exploited vulnerabilities associated with a given software using all 
vulnerabilities reported for the software. Regarding VDMs, we need to find a 
relationship between the discovery pattern of all vulnerabilities (S1) and those 
vulnerabilities that were exploited (S2). We focused on the ratio of the time to next 
vulnerability (TTNV) for exploited vulnerabilities over the TTNV associated with all 
vulnerabilities. We use this ratio as a multiplier in the equations associated the VDMs 
in the training phase to approximate the VDMs’ equations for exploited vulnerabilities. 
We use a resampling method and a filtering method to take care of the noisy nature of 
vulnerability data [81], [82]. For each software, we resample/split the vulnerability data 
(all vulnerabilities & exploited vulnerabilities) into intervals of 120, 150, 180, 210, 240, 
270, 300, 330, 360 days to remove the effect of daily fluctuations. For each interval (i-
th interval), we calculate the mean TTNV of the observations at each time step 
(MTTNV) and calculate the ratio of MTTNVs, Ratio𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑖(t) = MTTNV𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑡)/
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MTTNV𝐴𝑙𝑙(𝑡). Figures 14 and 15 show the box plot of ratios associated with each interval 
per software. The median of the ratios for each software, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 (Ratio𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑖(𝑡)) is 
almost constant over different intervals. The median values of the ratios per software 
are presented in Table 40. The VDM for exploited vulnerabilities is calculated as 
follows: 














 Box chart for TTNV coefficient ratio per web browser (S2/S1) 
 
Table 40: TABLE OF TTVN MEAN RATIOS PER SOFTWARE 
OS Windows Mac IOS Linux 
TTNV Ratio 
(Median) 
3.526 9.393 5.696 5.306 
Web Browser IE Safari Firefox Chrome 
TTNV Ratio 
(Median) 
3.360 5.792 10.917 50.127 
8.4.2 For the NNM 
Regarding the NNM, since we want to link two time series, we feed one time 
series (all vulnerabilities) into the NNM as input and select the output (𝑦𝑡) from the 
second time series (exploited vulnerabilities). In other words, the vector of inputs 
{𝑦𝑡−𝑝, . . . , 𝑦𝑡−2, 𝑦𝑡−1} belongs to S1 and the output is chosen from S2. Details on how 




For both scenarios (S1 and S2), we used the eight VDMs for the discovery 
process of vulnerabilities on eight well-known software (four OSs and four web 
browsers). The VDMs were fitted to the  datasets using a non-linear regression method 
described in [24].  In addition, for the first scenario (S1) we also used one NNM, which 
is capable of modeling nonlinearities. Since the NNM is a data driven model, we could 
not use it for scenario S2 due to lack of exploited vulnerabilities. 
We started the analysis by splitting the data into two groups of training and 
testing data. For scenario S1, both the VDMs and the NNM use a dataset that includes 
all vulnerabilities reported for all versions of a given software. For scenario S2, the 
VDMs use the data associated with exploited vulnerabilities reported for those 
versions. The training period for both scenarios starts from the time when the first 
exploited vulnerability associated with a given software was reported and continues 
until 12/31/2014. We made the predictions for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017. We then 
split the vulnerability data into intervals of 30 days as is common in the vulnerability 
analysis literature [18], [24], [25]. 
For scenario S1, for the VDMs, during the training period, the training data was 
used to estimate model parameters. Using the estimated parameters and the TTNV 
ratios we found from Section 8.4.1, we estimated the number of exploited 
vulnerabilities. Then, the estimations for each 30-day interval produced by the eight 
models were compared with the actual number of exploited vulnerabilities to calculate 
the prediction accuracy. For the NNM, for each software, we used the training data to 
train the NNM. The process is like feeding the NNM by one time series and comparing 
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the outputs with values associated with another time series. Using the trained NNM, 
we predicted the number of exploited vulnerabilities for the next steps. We calculated 
the prediction accuracy by comparing the obtained estimation and the actual number of 
exploited vulnerabilities.  
For scenario S2, for the VDMs, during the training period, the training data was 
used to estimate model parameters. The estimated final values for each 30-day interval 
produced by the eight models were compared with the actual number of exploited 
vulnerabilities to calculate the prediction accuracy. 
The Chi-square (χ2) goodness of fit test [24] was utilized for evaluating the 
quality of fit of each model on training datasets. For the training part, for the NNM, we 
used the MSE value to select the optimal analytical model, out of the models trained 
with different combinations of lags. Then, for each software, the best model was 
selected to make the prediction for the testing data set (the vulnerabilities reported in 
2015, 2016, and 2017). In this chapter, regarding the NNMs, we report the results 
associated with the best NNM.  
For the prediction part, we calculated the two normalized predictability 
measures, AE, AB. These indicators and their associated equations were introduced in 
Chapters 4 and 6. For the VDMs associated with each scenario, we also report ΔVAE𝑖
𝑘, 
which shows the difference between the AE of the i-the VDM and the VDM with 




𝑘  − VAE𝑚𝑖𝑛




where k is the k-th scenario,  VAE𝑖 is the AE of the i-th VDM, and VAE𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the lowest 
AE found in the set of VDMs examined in the scenario (i.e., the best model). Thus, the 
ΔVAE𝑖
𝑘 of the best VDM in a scenario is 0. 
To highlight the difference between the AE of the k-th model and the overall 
best model in both scenarios, we report ΔAE𝑖
𝐺, which is defined as follows:  
 
%ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 = (AE𝑗  − AE𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐺 ) ∗ 100                                                (30) 
 
where AE𝑗 is the AE of the j-th model, and AE𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐺  is the lowest AE found in the set of 
models examined (i.e., the best model). Thus, ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 of the best overall model is 0. In 
addition, if for a given model we have ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 = 1.2 , it means than the model has 1.2% 
higher prediction error than the best overall model.  
8.6 Results 
Tables 41-42 present the values of AE, AB, ΔVAE𝑖
𝑘, and ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 for the cases we 
analyzed per scenario per model (VDMs and NNM), respectively. Regarding p-values, 
we used * to show the models with p<0.05. AB can be positive (for overestimation) or 
negative (for underestimation), while AE is always positive. In each case, we first 
found the best VDM(s) per scenario by comparing their prediction accuracy and then 
compared the accuracy of those models with the NNM results. In other words, for each 
software, for the VDMs associated with each scenario, the models that had the smallest 
values of AE were selected as the best VDMs in terms of prediction and were 
highlighted in yellow. In addition, the VDMs with ΔVAE𝑖
𝑘 < 2 were also selected as 
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the best VDMs, which we assume, show similar prediction capability compared to the 
best VDM (the VDM(s) with ΔVAE𝑖
𝑘 = 0). For each software, the best overall model 
in both scenarios is colored in green (the model with ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 = 0). If a VDM is the best 
model of a scenario and simultaneously is the best overall model, is only colored in 
green. 
For each software, the normalized error values ((Ω𝑡 − Ω)/Ω) over prediction 
time are plotted in Figure 16 and Figure 17. The models with less fluctuations lead to 


















Table 41: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR OSS  PER SCENARIO (VDMS & NNM) 
Windows S1  S2 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟐 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.187 0.187 8.126 12.111  0.101 -0.097 1.703 3.539 
Weibull 0.148 0.148 4.245 8.230  0.139 -0.139 5.432 7.268 
AML 0.106 0.083 0.000 3.984  0.145 -0.145 6.021 7.856 
Normal 0.106 0.083 0.000 3.984  0.145 -0.145 6.021 7.856 
Power-law 0.277 0.277 17.076 21.061  0.084 0.084 0.000 1.836 
RE 0.387 0.387 28.122 32.106  0.138* 0.138 NS NS 
RQ 0.274 0.274 16.766 20.750  0.113 0.113 2.892 4.727 
YF 0.122 0.118 1.576 5.560  0.140 -0.140 5.579 7.415 
NNM 0.066 -0.024 NA 0.000  NA NA NA NA 
Mac S1  S2 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.215 -0.215 14.203 14.985  0.261 -0.261 0.000 19.599 
Weibull 0.251 -0.251 17.772 18.553  0.282 -0.282 2.038 21.637 
AML 0.257 -0.257 18.399 19.180  0.277 -0.277 1.577 21.177 
Normal 0.257 -0.257 18.399 19.180  0.277 -0.277 1.577 21.177 
Power-law 0.073 -0.008 0.000 0.781  0.101* -0.008 NS NS 
RE 0.081* 0.081 NS NS  0.092* 0.005 NS NS 
RQ 0.077 -0.011 0.341 1.122  0.094* 0.017 NS NS 
YF 0.248 -0.248 17.513 18.295  0.280 -0.280 1.834 21.433 
NNM 0.065 0.026 NA 0.000  NA NA NA NA 
IOS S1  S2 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟐 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.149 0.146 10.441 13.206  0.032 0.018 0.445 1.524 
Weibull 0.156 0.154 11.126 13.891  0.029 0.001 0.182 1.260 
AML 0.185 0.185 14.066 16.831  0.028 -0.014 0.000 1.079 
Normal 0.185 0.185 14.066 16.831  0.028 -0.014 0.000 1.079 
Power-law 0.156 0.154 11.153 13.918  0.240* 0.240 NS NS 
RE 0.301 0.301 25.647 28.412  0.279* 0.279 NS NS 
RQ 0.044 -0.007 0.000 2.765  0.153* 0.153 NS NS 
YF 0.220 0.220 17.555 20.321  0.028 -0.014 0.080 1.158 
NNM 0.017 -0.002 NA 0.000  NA NA NA NA 
Linux S1  S2 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.132 0.132 8.919 11.140  0.116 -0.116 7.620 9.542 
Weibull 0.140 0.140 9.732 11.954  0.128 -0.128 8.874 10.796 
AML 0.043 0.037 0.000 2.221  0.168 -0.168 12.811 14.733 
Normal 0.043 0.037 0.000 2.221  0.168 -0.168 12.811 14.733 
Power-law 0.182 0.182 13.914 16.135  0.040 0.040 0.000 1.922 
RE 0.282 0.282 23.969 26.190  0.045 0.045 0.540 2.462 
RQ 0.196 0.196 15.291 17.513  0.050 0.050 1.031 2.953 
YF 0.084 0.084 4.135 6.356  0.158 -0.158 11.843 13.765 
































 Prediction errors for Oss per scenario. The X-axis indicates time (Year). The Y-axis represents 








Table 42: PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS  PER SCENARIO (VDMS & NNM) 
IE S1  S2 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟐 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.121 -0.121 7.189 9.018  0.175 -0.175 11.004 14.475 
Weibull 0.120 -0.120 7.138 8.967  0.182 -0.182 11.700 15.170 
AML 0.188 -0.188 13.922 15.752  0.256 -0.256 19.048 22.519 
Normal 0.188 -0.188 13.922 15.752  0.256 -0.256 19.048 22.519 
Power-law 0.120 -0.120 7.113 8.942  0.087 -0.087 2.172 5.643 
RE 0.049 -0.049 0.000 1.829  0.065 -0.065 0.000 3.471 
RQ 0.102 -0.102 5.292 7.121  0.069 -0.069 0.386 3.856 
YF 0.126 -0.126 7.717 9.547  0.228 -0.228 16.253 19.724 
NNM 0.030 0.010 NA 0.000  NA NA NA NA 
Safari S1  S1 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟐 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.498 -0.498 20.921 41.101  0.140 -0.076 1.386 5.308 
Weibull 0.528 -0.528 23.943 44.123  0.126 -0.106 0.000 3.923 
AML 0.533 -0.533 24.492 44.672  0.131 -0.095 0.500 4.423 
Normal 0.533 -0.533 24.492 44.672  0.131 -0.095 0.500 4.423 
Power-law 0.357 -0.357 6.898 27.078  0.285 0.224 15.963 19.886 
RE 0.288 -0.288 0.000 20.181  0.265 0.193 13.924 17.847 
RQ 0.351 -0.351 6.312 26.493  0.270 0.202 14.462 18.384 
YF 0.527 -0.527 23.863 44.043  0.127 -0.104 0.101 4.024 
NNM 0.087 0.042 NA 0.000  NA NA NA NA 
Firefox S1  S1 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟐 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.324 0.324 15.768 31.419  0.010 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Weibull 0.324 0.324 15.743 31.394  0.029 -0.029 1.912 1.912 
AML 0.167 0.167 0.000 15.651  0.064 -0.064 5.344 5.344 
Normal 0.167 0.167 0.000 15.651  0.064 -0.064 5.344 5.344 
Power-law 0.355 0.355 18.888 34.539  0.209* 0.209 NS NS 
RE 0.492 0.492 32.510 48.162  0.199* 0.199 NS NS 
RQ 0.393 0.393 22.610 38.261  0.170* 0.170 NS NS 
YF 0.238 0.238 7.097 22.748  0.064 -0.064 5.370 5.370 
NNM 0.026 -0.024 NA 1.594  NA NA NA NA 
Chrome S1  S1 
 AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟏 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮  AE AB %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊
𝟐 %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒋
𝑮 
Gamma 0.531 -0.531 0.000 35.283  0.363 -0.363 9.162 18.482 
Weibull 0.557 -0.557 2.635 37.918  0.359 -0.359 8.724 18.045 
AML 0.544 -0.544 1.324 36.606  0.409 -0.409 13.722 23.043 
Normal 0.544 -0.544 1.324 36.606  0.409 -0.409 13.722 23.043 
Power-law 0.210* -0.204 NS NS  0.285 -0.231 1.404 10.725 
RE 0.108* -0.052 NS NS  0.271 -0.148 0.000 9.321 
RQ 0.325* -0.325 NS NS  0.330 -0.328 5.831 15.152 
YF 0.544 -0.544 1.275 36.557  0.473* -0.473 NS NS 

































 Prediction errors for web browsers per scenario. The X-axis indicates time (Year). The Y-axis 






Based upon the results provided by Tables 41-42, in terms of prediction 
accuracy (AE and HH), out of eight software we analyzed, scenario S1 led to the most 
accurate results in seven cases. Only for Firefox, the best VDM from scenario S2 was 
more accurate than the best model of scenario S1, which is NNM. In addition, 
considering both scenarios, the NNM was selected as the best prediction model in seven 
cases. As mentioned before, the VDMs with the * superscript are the models that had 
a p-value less than 0.5 and will not be considered in our analysis. In Tables 41-42, we 
used the term “NS” for these models, which stands for Not Satisfactory.  
For Windows, the best model from scenario S1, which is NNM (ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 = 0), is 
1.8% more accurate than the one from scenario S2 (the model with smallest AE in 
scenario S2, ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 = 1.836). For Mac, the best model is also NNM by having 19.59% 
smaller average prediction error (AE) than the best model from scenario S2. For IOS, 
Linux, IE, Safari, and Chrome the stories are like what happened for Windows and Mac 
by NNM (from S1) as being the best model, which comes up with 1.1%, 1.9%, 3.5%, 
3.9%, and 9.3% smaller prediction errors than the best models from scenario S2. For 
Firefox, the model with smallest AE (ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 = 0) belongs to scenario S2 by having 
1.6% smaller AE than the best model from scenario S1, which is NNM (ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 ≈ 1.6). 
Overall, scenario S1 provides more accurate results in seven cases (out of eight cases) 
for the number of future exploited vulnerabilities. In the only case that the best model 
from scenario S2 provided most accurate predictions, the performance of the best 
model from scenario S1 was only 1.6% worse. 
To evaluate the performance of our approach among VDMs, we also need to 
compare the results we found only from VDMs. Considering only VDMs, in terms of 
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prediction accuracy (AE and HH), out of eight software we analyzed, scenario S1 led 
to most accurate results in only two cases. In other words, for Mac, and IE, the best 
VDM from S1 had higher accuracy than the best VDM from scenario S2 by having 
18.8%, and 1.6% smaller prediction errors, respectively. However, the VDMs from 
scenario S1 were less than 2.2% different in prediction error in three cases compared 
to the best VDM from scenario S2. The error differences for Windows, IOS, and Linux 
are 2.2%, 1.6%, and 0.3%, respectively. Only for Safari, Firefox, and Chrome this 
difference is high and the best VDM from scenario S2 outperformed the best VDM 
from scenario S1 by having 16.2%, 15.7%, and 26% smaller prediction error, 
respectively. Overall, comparing only VDMs, scenario S1 was able to perform better 
than or as well as scenario S2 (with less than 2.2% error difference) in five cases.  
Another important factor, which plays a role in model selection is the tendency 
of a given model to overestimate or underestimate the results. In this research, we 
provided the average bias values (AB) as well as the visual fluctuation trend of 
normalized prediction errors (Figure 16 and Figure 17).  
Now, for each software, we compare the best overall model and the models of 
similar prediction power (those with ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 ≤ 2 ), in terms of average bias. For a given 
software, if there are multiple models that satisfy the mentioned condition, we consider 
the model with lowest AB. There are five software, which are qualified for this 
condition (i.e. Mac, IOS, Linux, IE, and Firefox). For Linux, IE, and Firefox, the 
absolute value of AB for the best overall model was smaller than the other candidates 
with ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 ≤ 2 by 2.1%, 3.9%, and 1.9%, respectively. This For Mac and IOS, the best 
overall model has higher absolute bias by 1.8%, and 0.1% difference, respectively.  
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However, in terms of bias, the final decision is depend on researcher’s priorities to 
select the best model.  
8.6.1 Summary of Results 
In terms of prediction accuracy (AE and HH), considering the OSs and web 
browsers (eight cases), our presented approach led to more accurate results in seven 
cases. Out of those cases, the NNM provided the best model in all the cases. Comparing 
only VDMs, in terms of prediction accuracy, scenario S1 was able to perform better 
than or as well as scenario S2 (with less than 2.2% error difference) in five cases. 
Please remember that all the conclusions we draw from this research and their 
validity are limited by our database uncertainties. 
8.7 Discussion 
We believe that the NNM's better execution contrasted with VDMs originates 
from the capacity of the NNM in foreseeing the nonlinearity nature of the vulnerability 
discovery process as a time series. Moreover, a common assumption in most VDMs is 
the pure S-shaped curve for vulnerability discovery process or considering a discovery 
function with a monotonic disclosure rate with constant total number of vulnerabilities. 
However, in practice, the vulnerability discovery process of a given software may have 
several linear and saturation phases as the total number of vulnerabilities may change 
as the result of introducing newer software versions. Furthermore, VDMs and 
traditional time-series functions only have one set of parameters for estimation. NNMs 
due to having multilayer perceptron structure, having various neurons per layer, and 
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utilizing diverse arrangement of parameters per neuron yield a structure with higher 
complexity for prediction.  
In terms of overall magnitude of bias (i.e., absolute value of AB), out of the 
seven cases that scenario S1 performed better, the best model from scenario S1 
outperformed the best VDMs from scenario S2 (those with ΔAE𝑗
𝐺 ≤ 2) in five cases. 
We believe that, in equivalent precision conditions, in terms of bias, the final 
decision is up to the specialist to pick the best model dependent on his/her priorities. 
Be that as it may, from a security perspective, it is better to pick a model, which gives 
more conservative results, in terms of prediction accuracy. In the current study, out of 
the seven NNMs that were chosen as the best models, the AB value in three cases 
(Windows, IOS, and Chrome) is negative. In other words, in these cases, the predictor 
underestimated the results. It can also be easily inferred from Figure 16 and Figure 17, 
where for Windows, IOS, and Chrome most of the prediction points associated with 
the NNMs are located under the X=0 axis. For rest of the cases, the best overall model 
has come up with positive ABs or conservative results.  
8.8 Limitations 
There are a few limitations to our work that prevents us from expanding our 
conclusions in a more generalized manner. Like previous chapters, there are some 
common limitations, as well. One of which is using announced published date of 
vulnerabilities as their discovery date (cf. Section 4.7). Another limitation is associated 
with the uncertainties of vulnerability databases and the way in which we combined all 
vulnerabilities reported for all versions of a given software to have sufficient data for 
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training the models. However this limitation does not only apply to our research and 
was employed by other researches, as well (cf. Section 4.7). 
Another limitation is with regard to the availability of public information for 
exploits. Many vendors and public repositories, with good reason, may not publish 
information on exploits as that is likely to increase the security risks for the end users 
of those systems. Responsible hackers are also more likely to not publish their exploits 
in public fora, as they can report them to the vendors directly. Malicious hackers are 
more likely to attempt to monetize their discoveries via dark web fora. Hence the 
predictions we make of publicly known exploits are likely to be underestimates of the 
true number of all vulnerabilities with exploits. Nevertheless, the approach we describe 
in this dissertation can be used by vendors and organization who have more information 
about exploits that they cannot share publicly to calibrate their predictions.  
8.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we evaluated the capability of all vulnerabilities associated with 
a software in predicting the number exploited ones. We compared two scenarios: S1 
(use of all vulnerabilities) and S2 (use only of exploited vulnerabilities). We used eight 
common vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) for both scenarios as well as a non-
linear neural network model (NNM) for the first scenario. Due to insufficient number 
of exploited vulnerabilities, it was not conceivable to use NNM for the second scenario. 
We used the aforementioned models for predicting the total number of future 
vulnerabilities over a prediction period of three years. The mentioned models were 
applied to vulnerability data associated with four well-known OSs and four well-known 
web browsers. We evaluated the models in terms of prediction accuracy and prediction 
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bias. The results showed that, out of eight software we analyzed, the first scenario led 
to more accurate results in seven cases. Moreover, out of these seven cases, the NNM 
was chose as the best model in all the cases. Comparing only VDMs, in terms of 
prediction accuracy, the first scenario was able to acceptably approximate the results 
from the second scenario in five cases (by performing better in two cases and providing 
less than 2.2% error difference in three cases). This is good since, we do not always 
have access to exploited vulnerability data, which are scarce, and need to predict their 




Chapter 9: Proposed Future Work and Summary of 
Completed Work 
9.1 Introduction 
Organizations face the issue of how to best allocate their security resources. 
Thus, they need an accurate method for assessing how many new vulnerabilities will 
be reported for the software they use in a given time period. Vulnerabilities reports of 
software systems are widely used by security researchers for security analysis (e.g. 
software reliability analysis). Researchers have used data from various vulnerability 
databases to study trends of discovery of new vulnerabilities, proposed various models 
for fitting the discovery times and predicting when new vulnerabilities may be 
discovered for a given product. Estimating the discovery times for new vulnerabilities 
is useful both for vendors of these products as well as the end-users as it can help them 
with their resource allocation strategies over time.  
This chapter concludes this dissertation with a summary of the research 
questions and contributions (9.2), a summary of published work (9.3), and areas of 
future work (9.4). 
9.2 Summary of the research questions and contributions  
9.2.1 Summary of dissertation and research questions 
Among the research conducted on vulnerability modeling, few studies have 
tried to provide a guideline about which model should be used in a given situation. In 
addition, to the best of our knowledge, there is no research focusing on modeling 
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exploited vulnerabilities. The only efforts in this area is probabilistic examination of 
intrusions by [52], [53]. Lack of data is a big barrier on the way to modeling exploited 
vulnerabilities using current VDMs or the machine learning techniques, which require 
considerable amount of data for satisfactory training. In other words, assuming the 
vulnerability data for a software is given, the research questions are the following: 
RQ1: What models are more accurate for vulnerability discovery process 
modeling? Should all models be applied every time a new dataset is provided?  
RQ2: Is there any feature in the vulnerability data could be used as a feature for 
identifying the most appropriate models for that dataset?  
RQ3: Can we predict disclosure of exploited vulnerabilities having few number 
of data points? Is there any way we could apply machine learning algorithms to predict 
exploited vulnerabilities?  
RQ4: Is the any link between discovery pattern of all vulnerabilities associated 
with a given software and its exploited vulnerabilities?    
9.2.2 Summary of contributions 
The goal of this dissertation is to propose a guideline to characterize the 
vulnerability discovery process using several common software 
reliability/vulnerability discovery models, also known as Software Reliability Models 
(SRMs)/Vulnerability Discovery Models (VDMs) a commonly used machine learning 
technique called Neural Networks. The proposed guideline covers the different aspects 
of vulnerability modeling including curve fitting and prediction. The data used in this 
research has been collected from six different public repositories of vulnerability data 
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sources including the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)15, the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database16, the CVE Details data source17, the 
Security database18, the SecurityFocus data source19, and the CXSecurity database20. 
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows: 
 A new guideline to characterize the vulnerability discovery process has 
been presented using eight common SRMs/VDMs. The proposed 
guideline covers vulnerability discovery modeling curve fitting and 
prediction.  
 Two strategies to improve curve fitting and prediction accuracy have 
been considered.  
 The effect of employing a data manipulation technique (i.e. clustering) 
on improving the curve fitting and prediction capabilities of the current 
SRMs/VDMs has been investigated.    
 The analysis has been implemented to two groups: operating systems 
(OSs), web browsers, and vendors. More specifically, we selected four 
OSs (Windows, Mac, IOS, and Linux), four web browsers (Internet 
Explorer, Safari, Firefox, and Chrome). 
 We discussed the effect of another data manipulation technique 
(vulnerability grouping) on prediction capabilities of the VDMs 









 Our proposed guideline was expanded by applying the mentioned 
models to only the vulnerabilities in NVD that have been exploited 
since it is necessary for vendors to identify the vulnerabilities at risk of 
being exploited, and to find those with the potential of having rapidly 
an exploit. 
 We presented a new modeling approach using neural networks and 
evaluate its prediction capability versus VDMs. The proposed approach 
provides higher curve fitting and prediction capabilities than current 
SRMs/VDMs.   
  A new approach was introduced for modeling and predicting the total 
number of publicly-known exploited vulnerabilities using all publicly-
known vulnerabilities reported for a given software. The proposed 
approach has higher curve fitting and prediction capabilities than 
current SRMs/VDMs.   
This dissertation would contribute to the ‘science of software reliability analysis’ 
and present a new guideline for vulnerability risk assessment that could be integrated as 
part of security tools, such as Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
systems. 
9.3 Summary of Published Work 
9.3.1 Published work 
A conference paper related to the research presented in this manuscript has been 
published. The paper, titled Cluster-based Vulnerability Assessment Applied on 
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Operating Systems was presented at the Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC) 
in September 2017 [58], investigated how cluster-based approach can improve the 
prediction capability of the NHPP Power-Law model in vulnerability discovery 
modeling of operating systems. This paper was elected as the distinguished paper of 
the conference. 
One journal paper related to the research presented in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation was published in September 2018. The paper, titled Cluster-based 
Vulnerability Assessment of Operating Systems and Web Browsers, published in 
Computing Journal, is an extend version of [83].  
A conference paper, not included in this dissertation research, was presented at 
the Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC) in September 2017. The paper, titled 
Application of Routine Activity Theory to Cyber Intrusion Location and Time [84], 
explored the applicability of criminological theories to cybercriminals in an attempt to 
learn more about attacker behavior. The daily patterns of attack attempts on a network, 
recorded over a period of four years, were examined to identify periods of higher 
intrusion volume.   
9.3.2 Additional completed work  
A conference paper, titled An Empirical Comparison of Grouping Strategies of 
Vulnerabilities for Modeling Vulnerability Discovery Processes, will be submitted in 
April 2019 to the Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC) 2019. This paper 
corresponds to Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
One journal paper, titled Vulnerability Prediction Capability: A Comparison 
between Vulnerability Discovery Models and Neural Network Models, will be 
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submitted in Summer 2019 to the Computers & Security journal. This paper 
corresponds to Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
One journal paper related to the research presented in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation will be submitted in Summer 2019. The paper, titled Predicting Exploited 
Vulnerabilities, submitted to IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure 
Computing, corresponds to chapter 8 of this dissertation.  
9.4 Future Work 
It is necessary for vendors to identify the vulnerabilities and their detection 
pattern. Specifically, the vulnerabilities at risk of being exploited, and find those with 
the potential of having rapidly an exploit. We showed that we can improve the accuracy 
for predicting future vulnerabilities whether is it exploited or not.  
Future work could be focused on exploring other nonlinear model structures 
using machine learning algorithms, which are capable of catching nonlinear nature of 
vulnerability data. Among them are Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) models, used 
for prediction time series, which may perform superior to NNMs at modeling 
dependencies between two points in a sequence. Generally, in NNMs, we have to 
choose the length of the input (number of inputs) beforehand. Then, it is not possible 
to learn functions that depends on the inputs that happened a long time ago. This 
problem could be solved by having an RNN, which can theoretically store information 






Appendix A: Clustering Tables 
Operating Systems 
Table 43: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER OS 
OS Windows Mac IOS Linux 
# Vulnerabilities 3434 2908 698 5812 
# Labelled Vulnerabilities 2974 (86.6%) 2513 (86.4%) 643 (92.1%) 4533 (78%) 
# Non-labelled Vulnerabilities 460 (13.4%) 395 (13.6%) 55 (7.9%) 1279 (22%) 
 
Table 44: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE AND OS 
Keywords Windows Mac IOS Linux 
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Table 45: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (WINDOWS) 
Keywords 
Windows 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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# Vulnerabilities 695 459 285 537 418 580 
 
Table 46: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (MAC) 
Keywords 
Mac 
1 2 3 4 5 6 












































































































# Vulnerabilities 688 123 312 418 937 35 
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Table 47: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (IOS) 
Keywords 
IOS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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# Vulnerabilities 456 28 13 35 26 48 39 
 
Table 48: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (LINUX) 
Keywords 
Linux 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
























































































Cross Site Scripting 




























# Vulnerabilities 1579 54 752 106 329 1166 547 
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Table 49: CLUSTER COMPOSITION FOR OSS 









1 Gain privileges G 
2 Obtain Information O 
3 DoS, Execute code, Memory corruption DEM 
4 DoS D 
5 Execute code, Overflow EO 





DoS, Execute code, Overflow, Memory 
corruption 
DEOM 
2 Gain privileges G 
3 Obtain Information O 
4 Execute code, Overflow EO 
5 Execute code (47.7%) E 




1 DoS D 
2 Execute code, Overflow EO 
3 Cross site scripting C 
4 DoS, Overflow DO 
5 Obtain Information O 
6 Bypass a restriction B 






1 DoS  D 
2 Directory Traversal DT 
3 DoS, Overflow DO 
4 DoS, Memory corruption DM 
5 Bypass a restriction B 
6 Execute code (52.1%) E 




Table 50: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER WEB BROWSER 
Web Browser Explorer Safari Firefox Chrome 
# Vulnerabilities 1862 994 1784 1906 
# Labelled Vulnerabilities 1601 (86.0%) 886 (89.1%) 1375 (77.1%) 1563 (82.0%) 







Table 51: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE AND WEB BROWSER 
Keywords Explorer Safari Firefox Chrome 




















































































































Table 52: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (INTERNET EXPLORER) 
Keywords 
Internet Explorer 
1 2 3 4 5 




























SQL Injection 0 0 0 0 0 












































0 0 0 0 
1 
(0.4%) 















Table 53: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (SAFARI) 
Keywords 
Safari 
1 2 3 






























































# Vulnerabilities 200 179 507 
Table 54: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (FIREFOX) 
Keywords 
Firefox 
1 2 3 4 5 










































































































Table 55: NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER TYPE, CLUSTER (CHROME) 
Keywords 
Chrome 
1 2 3 4 5 

































0 0 3 
(0.9%) 
Gain Privileges 















0 0 8 
(3.8%) 
0 0 








0 0 0 0 0 
CSRF 













# Vulnerabilities 868 99 212 55 329 



















1 DoS, Execute code, Overflow, Memory corruption DEOM 
2 Bypass a restriction B 
3 Execute code, Overflow, Memory corruption EOM 
4 Execute code E 






1 Obtain Information (47%) O 
2 DoS, Execute code DE 







1 Execute code, Overflow EO 
2 DoS, Execute code, Memory corruption DEM 
3 Execute code (44.5%) E 
4 DoS, Execute code, Overflow, Memory corruption DEOM 






1 DoS D 
2 Obtain Information O 
3 Bypass a restriction B 
4 Cross Site Scripting C 
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